[Gödel's incompleteness theorem] is by no means to be judged as only a negative result, rather it plays a similar role for proof theory as does the discovery of the irrational numbers for arithmetic.
in question are of independent interest. For not only are their formal properties distinct from those obtained in the manner of Gödel's (1931b) original proof or in the manner of subsequent combinatorial independence results -e.g. in virtue of being 0 2 rather than ⇧ 0 1 or ⇧ 0 2 -but they are also generated in a di↵erent manner. For rather than starting out by replacing putatively paradoxical notions like truth or denotation with surrogates like provability or demonstrable denotation, the method introduced by Kreisel and Wang begins with the observation that the relevant semantic notions for first-order languages are definable in appropriate higher-order extensions.
The independent statements obtained in this manner thus bear a closer resemblance to the putatively paradoxical ones than do those which figure in Gödel's original proof or in (e.g.) Boolos's (1989) formalization of Berry's paradox. As a consequence, the hope remains that results obtained in the manner of Kreisel and Wang still have something to teach us about the paradoxes which were used to generate them. Although both authors hinted at such a possibility, the thought that formal incompleteness might play a role in a uniform response to the paradoxes has also been largely overlooked by subsequent authors. I will develop this theme further in §5 in the context of describing how the method in question is related to the unification of the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes, absolute undecidability, the intensionality of arithmetization, and axiomatic theories of truth before o↵ering a brief synthesis in §6. §2. Historical setting Building on his earlier work in geometry (1899), Hilbert first employed the method of arithmetical interpretations to logical systems in his 1917-1918 lectures on the foundations of mathematics (1917) (1918) . In this setting, such an interpretation takes the form of an assignment of the numerical values 0 (true) and 1 (false) to the propositional variables X, Y, Z, . . ., together with the interpretation of disjunction as multiplication and negation as 1 X. A formula is taken to be valid if it evaluates to 0 under all such interpretations. Hilbert used these definitions to show the consistency and completeness of his axioms for the propositional calculus.
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In the first edition of Hilbert and Ackermann's textbook the Grundzüge der Theoretischen Logik (1928) a related technique is described for transforming first-order formulas into propositional ones, whereby each predicate symbol is associated with a collection of numerical substitution instances derived by replacing universally quantified formulas with conjunctions and existentially quantified ones with disjunctions. This yields a method for constructing counter-models to show the non-validity of formulas falsifiable in a finite domain by showing how they can be replaced by equi-satisfiable propositional formulas and invoking the completeness theorem for propositional logic. Gödel showed in his (1930) completeness proof for first-order logic how this technique could be extended to formulas possessing no finite countermodels by proving a form of what we would now recognize as Herbrand's Theorem and invoking König's Infinity Lemma.
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In the second edition of the Grundzüge (1938), Hilbert and Ackermann provide an exposition of Gödel's completeness proof which is then further formalized in §4.2 of certain steps for himself" (1953, p. 181) . In regard to these points, see notes 18, 30, and 55 below. 5 More precisely, Hilbert originally showed the Post completeness of the propositional axioms --i.e. if an underivable formula were to be added to the calculus as a scheme, the system would be become inconsistent. This was extended in Bernays's 1918 Habilitationsschrift to show semantic completeness in the familiar form "every valid formula is provable". See (Zach, 1999) for further discussion of these developments. 6 See (Dean, 2017) for further discussion of the historical context of Gödel's proof and its reception by Bernays, the introductory notes to (Feferman et al., 1986 ) for a detailed reconstruction, and (Dean & Walsh, 2017, §4) for more on the role of König's Lemma.
the second volume of the Grundlagen (1939) . By this point Hilbert and Bernays had also elaborated substantially on the role of what they referred to as the method of arithmetization for the development of the so-called finitary standpoint described in the first two chapters of the first volume (1934) . As I will discuss further in §5.1, one aspect of their view was that such interpretations may be of use in establishing the consistency of systems of analysis or set theory for which the existence of models otherwise represents an "idealizing assumption that properly augments the assumptions formulated in the axioms" (1934, p. 2/2). These considerations set the stage for Hilbert and Bernays's arithmetization of Gödel's completeness theorem in the second volume of the Grundlagen. Unlike modern presentations, this begins with a careful exposition in §4.1 of Gödel's method of the arithmetization of syntax. This machinery is employed to define a primitive recursive function q(x) for each first-order formula ' such that q(n) = 0 for all n 2 N if and only if ' is irrefutable from Hilbert's axioms for first-order logic. The proof of the completeness theorem given in §4.2 then proceeds by showing how the arithmetized syntactic definitions can be used to formalize the steps in Hilbert and Ackermann's rendition of Gödel's proof. This leads to a method for transforming an irreftutable formula ' of an arbitrary first-order language into a true arithmetical formula ' ⇤ by replacing its non-logical symbols by arithmetical formulas extracted from Gödel's construction. The proof thus yields one form of what is now called the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem:
Theorem 2.1 Let ' be a sentence of the first-order predicate calculus containing predicate letters P1(x), . . . , Pn(x) of arities k1, . . . , kn such that q(n) = 0 holds for all n 2 N. Then there exist formulas P ⇤ 1 (x), . . . , P ⇤ n (x) also of arities k1, . . . , kn over the language L Z = {0, s, +, x, <} such that N |= ' ⇤ where N denotes the standard model of arithmetic and '
⇤ denotes the L Z -formula formed by uniformly substituting P ⇤ i for Pi in '.
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The presentation of this result marks the point in the Grundlagen at which Hilbert & Bernays transition from their discussion of Gödel's completeness theorem to their discussion of his incompleteness theorems. Their account of the second incompleteness theorem in §5.1c famously provides the first full details of the proof at which Gödel (1931b) had merely hinted. But Hilbert & Bernays's treatment of the first theorem in §5.1b is also notable as it is preceded in §5.1a by an extended discussion of the paradoxes. This account in turn is informed by earlier discussions in Hilbert's (1917 Hilbert's ( -1918 lectures on the foundations of mathematics and the Grundzüge. Collectively, these sources provide expositions of Russell's paradox, the Liar, and several paradoxes involving the concept of denotation.
Hilbert is now thought to have learned of Russell's paradox soon after its independent discovery by Zermelo in or around 1899. This marked the beginning of a period during which the mathematical significance of various paradoxes and antinomies was actively discussed in Göttingen. During this period, Hilbert and his collaborators also undertook a careful consideration of Russell's logicism, the later phases of which are reflected in (1917) (1918) . This presentation served as the basis for §IV.4 of the Grundzüge (1928) in which Russell's paradox is presented as a variant of the Grelling-Nelson paradox. This formulation is given on (1939, pp. 252-253/260-263) and has traditionally been attributed to Bernays. A partial reconstruction of the original proof is given by Kleene (1952, §72) which is in turn presented in greater detail by Ebbs (2015) . Note that the statement is false if ' is allowed to contain the identity symbol = (for in this case, ' might be satisfiable only in a model of fixed finite size). This restriction may be lifted if identity is treated non-logically such that occurrences of = may be interpreted by an arithmetical formula = ⇤ defining an equivalence relation on the natural numbers. 8 See (Peckhaus & Kahle, 2002) and (Mancosu, 2003) for discussion of these developments.
Although the Grundzüge also contains a discussion of the Liar, this is developed in greater detail in §5.1a of the second volume of the Grundlagen relative to an arithmetical background theory which Hilbert & Bernays refer to as Formalism F. This system is not presented axiomatically but rather asserted to extend what Hilbert & Bernays refer to as rekursive Zahlentheorie by adding axioms defining a least-number operator µ and defining equations for primitive recursive functions su cient for carrying out the arithmetization of syntax as presented in §4.1.
9 The paradox is presented as a reductio of the assumption that there is a predicate W(x) definable in the language L F which provably satisfies the Tarski biconditionals (2.1)
for all L F -sentences '. Hilbert's lectures and the Grundzüge also contain descriptions of a paradox similar to that of Berry (as first described by Russell, 1908) . The Grundlagen (1939, pp. 262-268/271-277 ) develops a related paradox, which Hilbert and Bernays liken to that of Richard (1905) based on the assumption that there exists a definable denotation function d(x) which provably satisfies
for all closed L F -terms t (inclusive of those containing the least number operator). 10 I will return in §5.1 and §5.6 to the comparison of these treatments with latter day interests in axiomatic approaches to truth.
Although Hilbert & Bernays (1939) ultimately group these paradoxes together as semantische, the reaction which they register to them varies in detail across the sources we have been considering. What is most important for present purposes is that their discussion of the Liar in (1939, §5.1a) not only immediately precedes their presentation of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem in §5.1c but is also employed as a template for its exposition.
11 This begins as follows:
9 Although Hilbert & Bernays's characterization of "rekursive Zahlentheorie" itself evolved over the two volumes of the Grundlagen, it is reasonable to assume at this point in the text that it is a conservative extension by definitions of the system they call Zµ, which is itself a conservative extension of PA. 10 Hilbert & Bernays denote this function with the symbol e(x) rather than d(x).
Subsequent authors (e.g. Priest, 1997a; Read, 2016) have tended to view the inconsistency resulting from the assumption that such a function is definable as a sui generis antinomy -the so-called denotational paradox. But as Hilbert & Bernays themselves observe, the underlying argument is similar to their prior demonstration (1934, p. 330/335 ) that the denotation function for primitive recursive terms cannot itself be primitive recursive. This goes by a (now) familiar variant of Cantor's diagonal method involving the construction of the "anti-diagonal" function a(x) = subst(pd(x)q, x) + 1 (which Hilbert & Bernays denote by using a two-place function (a, n) = 'n(a) where '0(x), '1(x), . . . is assumed to be an enumeration of primitive recursive definitions). Wang (1955) later showed how this result can be transformed into an incompleteness theorem by observing that the denotation function for first order-arithmetical terms (including the µ-operator) can be formalized in second-order arithmetic and then invoking the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem in the manner discussed in §4.3 below. The same pattern also arises for the formalization of Berry's paradox -i.e. when the denotation function is formalized either by using a provability predicate (as was carried out by Boolos, 1989) or by the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem (as was carried out by Vopȇnka, 1966 and Kikuchi et al., 2012) , a similar incompleteness result can be obtained. 11 See (Sieg & Ravaglia, 2005) for a more complete reconstruction of (1939, §5.1-2) .
From the antinomy of the Liar, we are led to Gödel's theorems . . . by considering a modification of that antinomy, and applying the method of formal sharpening. (1939, pp. 269/278) In §5.1c Hilbert & Bernays provide a detailed exposition of how the proof of the first incompleteness theorem can be formalized in F leading in turn to the second incompleteness theorem. After this they ultimately make the following remark about the significance of the Liar:
With this demonstration that if F is consistent, the formula C expressing the consistency of F is underivable in F, the formalization of the modified Liar antinomy has reached its full consequence. In fact, this non-derivability is what the ordinary language rendition of the antinomy corresponds to in the sharply circumscribed deductive formalism. (1939, p. 284/294) This passage provides a precedent for the view which I will suggest in §5 was later developed in a more direct way by Kreisel and Wang --i.e . that when the everyday notions involved in the paradoxes are analyzed formally and then subjected to the method of arithmetization, the corresponding paradoxical statements are converted into instances of formal incompleteness, thereby dissolving them as potential threats to the development of infinitary mathematics.
Another role played by the paradoxes in the work of Hilbert and his collaborators was as a constraint on the proper development of systems of higher-order logic. In the second edition of the Grundzüge (1938), for instance, it is suggested that their discussion of Russell's paradox shows the untenability of an "undi↵erentiated predicate concept" (p. 120). And in (1917-1918) and (1928) Hilbert suggests that introducing a hierarchy of orders of predicates was su cient to ensure that analogs of the Liar and the Richard paradoxes could not arise.
On the other hand, the mathematical motivation which is given in these sources for the introduction of higher-order systems is that of formalizing analysis. In (1938) this is carried out in the system which Hilbert and Ackermann state to be equivalent to the simple theory of types up to order !. But they also observe in §IV.6 that only second-order quantification is required to formalize the existence of least upper bounds for definable sets of real numbers formalized as Dedekind cuts. And in fact a system which we would now recognize as second-order logic is explicitly introduced in §IV.1 of the Grundzüge to formalize this construction.
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The importance of second-order logic to our current topic derives not only from its potential use in axiomatizing analysis, but also from Hilbert & Bernays's recognition that second-order languages allow for the formalization of first-order semantic notions. They first discuss such a possibility in (1939, §5.1a) after remarking that that their axiomatic presentation of the Liar can be regarded as providing an alternative proof of Tarski's Theorem (1935) on the undefinability of truth for formalism F. But at the end of this section they also remark that it is possible to formalize the definition of truth for L F in an appropriate higher-order extension of this language.
The possibility of providing a mathematical formalization of the definition of truth for a mathematical language L1 in an expressively richer language L2 had, of course, been 12 In (Hilbert & Ackermann, 1928) this is referred to as the erweiterten Kalkül but is then rechristened as the Prädikatenkalkül der zweiten Stufe in (Hilbert & Ackermann, 1938) . A version of this system is adjoined to a first-order arithmetic theory to conduct a more extensive development of analysis in Supplement IV of (Hilbert & Bernays, 1939) . These sections are often cited as the origin of the theory now known as secondorder arithmetic (Z2) and as an anticipation of Reverse Mathematics (Simpson, 2009 ). See (Dean & Walsh, 2017, §3) for further discussion of these claims.
foreseen by Gödel (1931b) and is also alluded to repeatedly by Tarski (1935) . 13 However, neither Gödel nor Tarski produced such a definition explicitly. On the other hand, in (1939, §5.2e) Hilbert & Bernays not only observed that it su ces to take L2 to be the language of second-order arithmetic in the case that L1 is a first-order arithmetical language, but they also explicitly constructed a second-order formula which serves as a truth definition for L F . I will return to the details of this definition in §4.3 and to its significance in regard to the foundational project of the Grundlagen in §5.1. But these developments also served as the direct antecedent to Kreisel and Wang's work on the relation of the paradoxes to the incompleteness phenomena to which we now turn. §3. Mathematical preliminaries 3.1. Languages and theories The incompleteness results which will be presented in §4 are most naturally understood in relation to a first-order arithmetical theory Z and a second-order theory S of sets and classes. The respective roles of these theories is as follows: 1) Z must be su ciently expressive to formalize syntax and su ciently strong to derive a formalized version of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem; 2) S must be su ciently strong to interpret Z and su ciently expressive to allow for a natural formalization of the set theoretic and semantic notions which figure in the paradoxes.
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In their original presentations, Kreisel and Wang took Z to be the system Zµ of Hilbert & Bernays (1939) , corresponding to a conservative extension of first-order Peano arithmetic [PA] with an axiomatization of the least-number operator. But for present purposes it will be convenient to assume that Z is a subsystem of PA itself. Recall that this theory is formulated in the first-order language L Z = {0, s, +, ⇥, <} and consists of the base theory PA together with the induction schema Ind(⌃n) for ⌃n-formulas for all n 2 N. We will also have occasion below to consider the fragment I⌃2 consisting of PA together with Ind(⌃2).
The status of the theory S is more complicated. Although in his original presentation, Kreisel (1950) only defined this system implicitly, he later made clear in (1953) that S can be taken to be a fragment of a form of what is now called Gödel-Bernays set theory. Systems answering to this name (and its various cognates) went through several stages of development which in turn led to distinct axiomatizations. It will thus be useful to be more precise about the relationship between contemporary presentations of GB and the more familiar first-order theory ZF.
Recall that ZF is a one-sorted first-order theory formulated in the language L ZF containing the set variables x, y, z, . . . and 2 as its sole non-logical symbol. In his original exposition, Bernays described a two-sort theory which also contained class variables X, Y, Z, . . . which had separate set and class membership relations x 2 y and x⌘Y .
15 For present purposes, however, it will be convenient to consider the one-sorted axiomatization given 13 See in particular p. 188 footnote 1, pp. 195-196, and pp. 236-237 in Tarski (1935) and also footnote † in the English translation ). 14 As we will see, S can take the form of either a set theoretic system with class variables such as GB or an arithmetical system with number class variables such as ACA0. Although I will follow the contemporary convention of referring to these theories as "second-order", it should be kept in mind that both systems are based on predicative restrictions to the comprehension scheme. As such, it is equally natural to regard them as two-sorted first-order theories whose models are given by specifying separate firstand second-sort domains together with a definition of the membership relation 2 which holds between first-and second-sort objects. 15 Bernays (1937) states that he originally presented a variant of von Nuemann's earlier axiomatization of set theory in lectures delivered in [1929] [1930] in Göttingen. He also by Mendelson (1997, §4 .1) which contains only class variables which is in turn similar to the system presented by Gödel (1940) . The language of L GB contains 2 as its sole non-logical symbol as well as class variables X, Y, Z, . . . We define M (x) (i.e. "x is a set") as 9Y (x 2 Y ) and introduce set quantifiers 8x'(x) and 9x'(x) as abbreviations for 8X(M (X) ! '(X)) and 9X(M (X)^'(X)). In order to formulate the axioms of GB, we first introduce the mapping (·)
+ results from replacing the set variables x, y, z, . . . with the class variables X, Y, Z, . . . in ' (renaming as necessary to avoid clashes) and restricts quantifiers by M (·). Also consider the map (·) : L GB ! L ZF which is defined only for sentences in which all quantifiers are bound by M (·) and which replaces X, Y, Z, . . . with x, y, z, . . . (renaming variables as necessary) and removing the relativization.
Equality between classes in GB is axiomatized by
GB additionally includes the (·) + translations of each of the following axioms of ZF: Null Set, Pairing, Sum Set, Powerset, Infinity. GB also includes the following class existence axioms corresponding to the so-called Gödel operations:
Let Fun(X) express that the class X is a class of ordered pairs which is additionally a function. GB also includes the following version of the axiom of Replacement (Replacement) 8X(Fun(X) ! 8x9y8z(z 2 y $ 9v(hv, zi 2 X^v 2 x))) expressing that the image of a set under a (class) function is a set.
The foregoing principles provide a finite axiomatization of GB. A notable property of this system is that it is still possible to prove all instances of the comprehension scheme for so-called predicative formulas -i.e. formulas which may contain bound set variables but do not contain bound class variables -without using Replacement. This is the content of what Bernays originally called the Class Theorem (1937, p. 72-77) :
Theorem 3.1 Let '(x, Y1, . . . , Ym) be a predicative formula of L GB with free set and class variables as displayed. Then
The Class Theorem may also be used to show that GB proves all instances of the ZF Separation scheme -i.e.
(Separation) For all '(x, y1, . . . , yn) 2 L ZF with free variables displayed, 8u9z8x(x 2 z $ '(x, y1, . . . , yn)^x 2 u) described such a system in a letter to Gödel dated 3 May 1931 (Feferman et al., 2003, pp. 105-115) which is then further elaborated in a series of seven papers in the Journal of Symbolic Logic published between 1937 and 1954 (reprinted in Müller, 1976 . See (Kanamori, 2009 ) for more on the history of Bernays's axiomatization and its relation to those of Von Neumann (1925) and Gödel (1940) . This may be shown either using Replacement or from the following weaker principle which Bernays referred to as the Subclass axiom
stating that the intersection of a class and a set is a set.
Define GB to be the result of replacing the axiom Separation with Subclasses in the axiomatiziation of GB and ZF to be ZF without the L ZF -replacement scheme (i.e. Zermelo set theory). It follows from the above that GB and GB respectively extend ZF and ZF in the following sense: for all ' 2 L ZF , if ZF`', then GB`' + and if ZF `', then GB `' + . 16 A more substantial result is that this translation in fact yields a conservative extension in the sense that if ' is in the domain of (·) and GB`', then ZF`' and if GB `', then ZF `' .
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The axiomatization Kreisel originally employed in formulating his incompleteness results is similar to an extension of GB with function symbols intended to denote each of the Gödel operations. Suppose, for instance, that we let T1, . . . , T7 be Skolem functions for each of the existentially bound variables in B1,
i be the Skolemization of 1  i  7 using T1, . . . , T7, and let S be the theory consisting of GB together with B S 1 . . . B S 7 . A standard argument shows that S is a conservative extension of ZF . And a simple modification of the proof of the Class Theorem also shows that for each predicative formula '(x1, . . . , xn, Y1, .
In the case where '(x1, . . . , xn) does not contain class parameters, the corresponding L Sterm can thus be thought of as providing a name -which I will refer to as a class term -for the set defined by the formula.
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It is also natural to ask whether there exists a two-sorted theory of arithmetic which extends PA with class axioms in the same way in which GB extends the one-sorted theory ZF. One such theory is the system of second-order arithmetic Z2 formulated over the 16 To see that GB proves all instances of Separation, consider '(x) 2 L ZF and let u be a set. Since '(x) + is a predicative formula, the Class Theorem can be used to obtain a class Z such that GB `8x(x 2 Z $ '(x)). But then the existence of a set z such that 8x(x 2 z $ '(x)^x 2 u) follows from Subclasses. To see that Subclasses follows from Separation, suppose that Y is a class and x is set. If Y = ;, then Y \ x is a set by Null Set. Otherwise let a 2 Y and define a class function F from x to x by F (z) = z if z 2 Y and F (z) = a otherwise. Since this definition is predicative, F exists by the Class Theorem. But now Y \ x = {u : 9z(F (z) = u)^z 2 x} exists by Separation. 17 The analogous result for GB was first shown by Novak (1950) and Mostowski (1950) via a (now) familiar model expansion argument which relies on a set theoretic formalization of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem -see, e.g., (Lévy, 1976, p. 190 ) for a concise formulation. Shoenfield (1954) also showed that this result can also be obtained proof theoretically by using the second-epsilon theorem of (Hilbert & Bernays, 1939) . 18 Suppose, for instance, that we introduce the names E = df T1 for the membership relation, X = df T3(X) for the complementation function, and D(X) = df T4(X) for the domain function. Then V = df D(E) names the universe, ; = df V names the empty class, etc. Similar axiomatizations of GB-like systems with (o cial or definitionally introduced) class terms were common prior to the contemporary adoption of ZFe.g., Gödel (1940) , (Shoenfield, 1954) , (Bernays & Fraenkel, 1958) and (Vopȇnka & Hájek, 1972) . The axiomatization which (Kreisel, 1953, p. 48 ) ultimately proposed to formulate his incompleteness results still di↵ers from these in that it omits both Infinity and principles such as Replacement or Subclasses which are required to obtain the separation scheme for sets. I will return to discuss the role of these principles with respect to Kreisel's (1950) 
and the full schema comprehension scheme
where '(x) may contain both number and number class variables and parameters (but not X free). If this scheme is limited to a quantifier class C -e.g. ⇧ 1 1 or 1 1 -then the system obtained is referred to as C-CA0. And if comprehension is restricted to formulas without bound number class variables, the resulting system is known as ACA0 (for arithmetical comprehension). The latter theory can be shown to be conservative over PA and we will see below that it provides a natural base theory for formalizing the semantic paradoxes. 3.2. Interpretations Substantial use will also be made below of the notion of an interpretation of a theory T2 over the language L2 in a theory T1 over the language L1. Recall that such an interpretation is a mapping (·) i : L2 ! L1 which associates an L1-formula with each non-logical symbol ↵(x) of L2 an L1-formula ↵,i (x) of appropriate arity, defining constant symbols via definite descriptions as appropriate. This mapping is extended to L1 formulas by commuting with propositional connectives and restricting quantifiers to an L1-formula i (x) which gives the domain of (·)
i . We additionally require that T1`9x i (x) -i.e. the domain of (·)
i is non-empty -and that for all L2-formulas ', if T2`', then T1`' i -i.e. T2 proves the images of all theorems of T2 under (·) i .
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The most important source of interpretations in the sequel will be the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem. Another familiar example is the so-called ordinal interpretation (·) s of the language of arithmetic in that set theory. To formulate this with respect to L Z and L GB , we assume that the theory of ordinal numbers has been developed in GB leading to definitions of 0 s = ; (i.e. the first ordinal), x + s y (ordinal addition), x ⇥ s y (ordinal multiplication), x < s y (ordinal less than) and ! (the least infinite ordinal). We
provides an interpretation of PA (and thus also of weaker arithmetical theories) not only in ZF but also in weaker theories like ZF and ZF -Infinity -e.g. (Kaye & Wong, 2007) . By the results summarized above, this extends to GB and related theories such as S.
There is a related interpretation (·) s 2 of Z2 and its subsystems in GB and thus also in S. In this case, we must revise our original definition of of interpretation to provide definitions 1(x) and 2(x) of its number and number class domains. To this end, we may define 1(x) = x 2 ! as before and 2(X ) = X 2 P(!). If we now add the inductive clauses (x 2 Y ) (Simpson, 2009 ) for a canonical formulation of these theories. 20 This is the notion of relative interpretability first explicitly introduced in (Tarski et al., 1953, §I.1.5) . See (Kreisel, 1950 (Kreisel, , 1952 (Kreisel, , 1955 and (Feferman, 1960) for contemporaneous discussions of the origin of this notion in relation to Hilbert and Bernays's method of arithmetization and the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem. For a more complete statement of the standard definitions see, e.g., (Hájek & Pudlák, 1998, pp. 148-150) .
a number of generalizations and refinements have been obtained. The first of these was provided by Kreisel (1950) in the course of presenting the first of the incompleteness results which I will formulate in §4. Kreisel observed that not only does the irrefutability of a formula ' in the predicate calculus entail the existence of an arithmetical interpretation (·) ⇤ in which ' ⇤ is true, but that this fact can be formalized in Hilbert & Bernays's theory Zµ using the notion of interpretability.
To state Kreisel's result in contemporary terms, let Prov T (x) be the canonically defined provability predicate for a recursively axiomatizable theory T and Con(T) its canonical consistency statement ¬Prov T (p0 = 1q).
Theorem 3.2 Let T be a recursively axiomatizable theory over the language L T = {P1, . . . , Pn, f1, . . . , fm, c1, . . . , c k } and let Z extend I⌃2. Then there are 0 2 L Z -predicates (x), P In Kreisel's original proof of Theorem 3.2 he constructed the definition of (·) z by showing how it was possible to directly formalize Hilbert & Bernays's (1939) original proof of Theorem 2.1, which in turn follows the method of Gödel (1930) .
21 On the other hand, Feferman (1960, pp. 61-62) later realized that it is also possible to formalize Henkin's (1949) more familiar completeness proof in a su ciently strong fragment of PA. It will be useful to summarize the main steps of this construction so as to illustrate some additional features of the interpretation (·) k which is obtained.
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We begin by observing that if T is recursively axiomatizable, then it is possible to obtain a primitive recursive enumeration of all L T -formulas with the free variable x as '1(x), '(x2), . . . and also an associated countable set of C = {c' 0 , c' 1 , . . .} of new Henkin constants. On this basis we define the set of witness axioms for L T (3.5)
A familiar argument shows that T + H T is conservative over T, from which it follows that if T is consistent, then so is T + H T . We now wish to describe in a manner which can be expressed in L Z a method for constructing a Henkin-complete extension of T -i.e. a deductively closed set T of L H T = L T [ C-sentences extending T such that i) for all formulas ' of this language, either ' 2 T or ¬' 2 T , ii) if 9x'(x) 2 T , then there is a constant c 2 C such that '(c) 2 T , and iii) if T is consistent, then T is consistent.
As I will discuss further in §5.5, there is by no means a unique method for defining T , even relative to a fixed recursive presentation of T. For present purposes, however, it will be convenient to employ the following familiar construction: i) let 0, 1, . . . be a recursive enumeration of all L H T -sentences; ii) define
is defined inductively according to the following extension condition:
We now wish to use the set T = S i2N i T to define a model of T whose domain comprises the constant symbols C. In so doing we face the familiar problem that since T will contain 21 The statement appears on p. 266 of (Kreisel, 1950) and the proof is given on pp.
267-273. 22 See, e.g., (Lindström, 1997, §6 .1) for additional details. sentences of the form c' i = c' j (for i 6 = j), we cannot take the interpretation of c' i to be this symbol itself. Since we ultimately wish to define a model arithmetically, one means of circumventing this problem is to extend the Gödel numbering p·q -which we assume is already in place for L T -to C. We can then define the function h(pc' i q) = µx.(x = pc' j q^c' i = c' j 2 T ) which enumerates the least members of equivalence classes of Henkin constants up to provable equality in T .
In the general case, h(x) may not be computable. But it is straightforward to see that it is possible to construct a L Z -formula (x) defining the function the Gödel number of the xth constant in the range of h(x) relative to the definition of T given above. The definition of i+1 T in terms of i T can be formalized by a L Z -formula 8z⌘(x, y, z) (for ⌘(x, y, z) 2 0 1 ) expressing that the formula with Gödel number x is a member of y T . We can then obtain a ⌃ 0 2 -formula (x) = df 9y8z⌘(x, y, z) expressing that there is a stage in the construction such that the formula with Gödel number x is adjoined to T . ⌃ 0 2 -induction hence su ces to show that the construction of i T is defined for all i. Suppose we also introduce the following standard abbreviations for L Z -formulas defining the following notions: SentL T (x) for formula expressing the set of Gödel numbers of L Tsentences, Formv L T (x) for the formula expressing the set of Gödel numbers of L T -formulas with free variable v, Var(x) for the set of Gödel numbers of variables, subst(x, y) for the Gödel number of the formula formed by substituting the term with Gödel number y into the first free variable of the formula with Gödel number x, ProvFol(x) for provability of the formula with Gödel number x in pure first-order logic, Con( (x)) for the consistency of any finite set of formulas satisfying (x), and x · y for the code of the sequence formed by concatenating the codes x and y.
Making use of the familiar "dot" notation of Feferman (1960) , we can now record several facts which collectively formalize that (x) defines a Henkin-complete extension of T:
These properties respectively express the fact that (x) defines a set of formulas which extends T, is consistent, is closed under deductive consequence, is closed under the Henkin witness property, and is complete in the sense that it contains the negation of ' just in case it fails to contain '. It follows from (3.7c,d,e) and the standard interdefinabilties of the connectives and quantifiers that (x) satisfies compositional clauses similar to those appearing in Tarski's inductive definition of truth (a point to which I will return in §5.5). Note finally that it follows from (3.7e) that a necessary and su cient condition for the membership of a formula ' in the set T defined by (x) is that ¬' is not a member of T . It follows that we could also define (x) by the ⇧ 0 2 -formula 8y9z¬⌘(¬x, y, z) and thus that (x) is in the formula class 
By an external induction using (3.7a-e) it may now be shown that for all L T -formulas '(x1, . . . , xn) with free variables displayed
Specializing to the case of sentences we thus have
The foregoing observations comprise what might be called the syntactic form of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem. This version will be su cient for most of the applications considered below. However it should also be evident that (3.9) can be understood as expressing that (x) defines truth in an arithmetical model of T described by the interpretation (·)
z . This point can be appreciated most vividly when T is a L Z -theory and the Theorem 3.2 is applied to applied to T itself. For consider a model M1 of T in which Con(T) is also satisfied -i.e. M1 |= T + Con(T). In this case it is also possible to define another model M2 |= T relative to M1 such that by interpreting the non-logical terms of T according to formulas given by (·) k relative to M1. This can be compared to the standard construction of a model of T from the maximally consistent set T defined in the non-formalized version of the Henkin construction.
The foregoing observation can also be generalized by modifying the definition of the unary predicate (x) to obtain a binary predicate (x, y) which defines satisfaction rather than truth in the following sense. Definition 3.3 Let Z be an arithmetical theory extending I⌃2, M1 |= Z, and M2 a structure for the language of a recursively axiomatizable theory T. We say that M2 is strongly definable in M1 just in case
There is an L Z -formula (x, y) and such that for all a1, . . . , an 2 |M2| such that
where h. . .i is a coding function for finite sequences.
The following semantic form of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem can now be obtained (cf., e.g., :
Theorem 3.4 Let Z ◆ I⌃2 and let T be a recursively axiomatizable L T -theory. Then if M1 |= Z + Con(T), there is a model M2 |= T which is strongly definable in M1. Moreover, if T possesses an infinite model, then the interpretation of the equality symbol given by (x, y) can be the identity relation on M1.
In the case where T is itself an L Z -theory, another consequence of strong definability is the following:
Proposition 3.5 Let T be a recursively axiomatizable L Z -theory extending PA , M1 |= I⌃2 be such that M1 |= Con(T) and M2 |= T be strongly definable in M1. Then there is an M1-definable embedding f : |M1| ! |M2| onto an initial segment of M2.
Underlying this result is the observation that if M2 is strongly definable in M1 then there exist L Z -formulas 0(x) and s(x, y) which define the least element element 0 M 2 and successor function s M 2 (x) of M2 relative to M1. Letting (t)i denote a standard coding of finite sequences, the graph of the function f (x) can thus be defined by the formula
and s(x, y), it can then be verified by ⌃ 0 2 -induction that f (x) preserves sums and products, is one-one and onto an initial segment. It thus follows that if M2 |= T is strongly definable in M1 then M2 is an end extension of M2.
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Another important consequence of the definability of the embedding f (x) is that it provides a means of formalizing substitution into the image of a formula under an interpretation obtained from the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem. Suppose, for instance,
as above. We also introduce the symbol f(x) to abbreviate the function defined by f (x, y) and write ' ⇤ (x) to denote the result of applying the inductive clauses in the definition of (·) ⇤ to '(x) while treating x as a free variable. ' ⇤ (f(n)) thus expresses that '(x) holds of the nth element of the model defined by (·)
⇤ . More generally, the following may now be shown by external induction on n:
As we will see in the next section, the definability of f (x) is one of several aspects of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem which allows us to obtain statements which provably di↵er in truth value between the models M1 and M2 obtained in Theorem 3.5 and which thereby must be independent of T.
3.4. Arithmetized completeness for GB and related systems Applying Theorem 2.1 to a finitely axiomatizable L S -theory such as GB or S yields an arithmetical formula (x 2 y) z which interprets the membership relation relative to Z. By next applying Theorem 3.4 in the case where M1 is the standard model of arithmetic N = hN, 0, s, +, ⇥, <i we may also obtain a model either of the form M2 = hN, Ei for GB or of the form M2 = hN, E, B1, . . . , B7i for S where E ✓ N ⇥ N is the extension of (x 2 y) z in N and Bi : N j ! N are interpretations T z i of the Skolem terms Ti corresponding to the Gödel operations.
Theorem 3.2 highlights how an arithmetical system such as I⌃2 is a natural theory in which to formalize this construction. But it is also clear that we could work over any theory T for which there is an interpretation (·)
In this case, Theorem 3.2 also provides an interpretation (·) z of T itelf over I⌃2 + Con(T). But since 23 A version of Proposition 3.5 is assumed at one point in Kreisel's (1950, p. 273) original incompleteness proof. However it appears to be Wang (1955, p. 36 ) who first formulated the definition of f (x) explicitly. See (Smorynski, 1984, p. 41 ) for references to later rediscoveries and applications of Proposition 3.5.
the composition of interpretations is itself an interpretation,
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In the first case we will be interested in below we will have T = S. Since all models of S are infinite, Theorem 3.4 allows us to obtain an interpretation (·) z : L S ! L Z for which z(x) is x = x -i.e. the domain of (·) z is taken to be the set of all natural numbers. Now
Note that in this case we will have ⇤(x) = x 2 !, from which it follows that all quantifiers in the image '
⇤ of an L S -formula ' under the composite interpretation will be relativized to !.
Note also that (·) ⇤ respectively associates an L S -formula T 1 (x, y), T 2 (x1, x2, y), . . . , T 7 (x, y) with the terms T1, . . . , T7 denoting the Gödel operations such that the former are provably equivalent to arithmetical formulas in S. In the arithmetical case, the analogous observation allows us to obtain an arithmetical formula defining the embedding function introduced in Proposition 3.5. This is possible in part because Z proves the statement 8x9t((t)0 = 0^8i < x((t)i+1 = (t)i + 1)^x = (t)x) expressing that every number is obtained by iterating the successor function and is hence canonically denoted by a numeral. But although no analogous result about sets is assumed with respect to S, it is still possible to formalize substitution of class terms under the scope of (·)
⇤ in S in a manner which parallels Corollary 3.6.
Say that a class Y is nameable if there exists some closed class term T such that S proves Y = T . It is a consequence of the Class Theorem and (3.1) that all predicatively definable classes are namable. But as the set ClTermL S of closed class terms is clearly countable, it is also not di cult to construct a formula ⌫(x, Y ) of L S which defines the graph of a bijection between ! and ClTermL S . Following Myhill (1952) we may, for instance, start out by assigning a code number to each of the primitive terms T1, . . . , T7 and then define a function g(x) which enumerates the codes of all class terms in some standard way which is recursive according to their structure. ⌫(y, Y ) can then be taken to assert that y is a finite sequence of codes in the range of g(x) which form a formation sequence such that there is a corresponding finite sequence of classes formed by applying Gödel operations in the analogous way whose final element is Y . Note that this naturally corresponds to a ⌃ asserting that all classes are namable and showed that it is consistent with GB together with Gödel's (1940) Axiom of Constructibility (i.e. V = L). However, what will be of most use below is his demonstration that over GB, V = L also entails that each nonempty namable class has a nameable member -i.e.
Theorem 3.7 (Myhill, 1952 
The proof of this result relies on the fact that over GB + V = L it is possible to define in LS a well-ordering of the constructible sets. Following (Gödel, 1940, §V) , this can then 24 In the case where T is not an L Z -theory Con(T) must here be understood to denote the interpretation of the canonical L Z consistency statement for T in L T -i.e. what we would otherwise denote by (Con(T)) t . Note also that the identity interpretation (·) i which translates all symbols of L T as themselves is also clearly an interpretation of T in T + Con(T). But whereas for this interpretation we have T`' $ ' i , we will see below that this cannot be the case for all ' for the sorts of interpretations obtained from the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem. be used to obtain a predicatively defined choice function As which when applied to a non-empty class X returns a "designated" set As(X) 2 X. It may be shown that namable classes are constructible and also that if X is namable, then so is As(X). Thus since As is definable in terms of the Gödel operations, it can finally be shown that there is a class term As denoting As such that
As we will see in §4.2, while the naming function N(y) is definable in L S , it cannot be defined by any predicative formula (unless is S is inconsistent). On the other hand, all of the quantifiers in the formulas T 1 (x, y), T 2 (x1, x2, y), . . . , T 7 (x, y) interpreting the Gödel operations are relativized to !. Since these formulas are thus predicative, it follows that S supplies corresponding class terms T ⇤ . Now suppose that T 2 ClTermL S and n 2 N are such that S`N(n) = T (where n is now understood to abbreviate a term denoting the nth finite ordinal). Note that in this case we will also have that S`(N(n) = T ) ⇤ and thus also S`
25 Putting these observations together, we thus have for all L S -formulas '(x)
This shows that if we restrict attention to namable classes, then we are indeed able to formalize substitution into the scope of an interpretation of (·) ⇤ of S in S + Con(S) in parallel to (3.13). §4. Paradoxes and incompleteness The goal of this section will be to illustrate how the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem provides a tool for transforming a range of familiar paradoxes into formal incompleteness results. The general method will be as follows: i) it is first shown how a given "paradoxical notion" may be naturally formalized as a predicate '(x) in the language of a second-order theory T which interprets Z; ii) it is then shown that the construction of a statement '(x) obtained from '(x) in the manner of one of the original paradoxes (e.g. a Russell-like or Liar-like sentence) does not yield a contradiction but rather is typically decidable over T; iii) Theorem 3.2 is then invoked to obtain an arithmetic interpretation (·) ⇤ of T which is used to reinterpret the non-logical terms appearing in '(x) leading to a statement ( '(x) ) ⇤ which is provably equivalent to an L Z -formula over T; iv) '(x) is finally shown to be undecidable over T relative to an appropriate consistency assumption.
I will return in §5.2 to discuss both the apparent uniformity of this method and its bearing on the paradoxes in their original non-arithmetized forms. But before getting underway, it will be useful to first isolate a result which will often be su cient to demonstrate the undecidability of statements constructed in the manner just described.
The undecidability lemma Suppose that T interprets I⌃2 and (·)
⇤ : L T ! L T is an interpretation of T in T + Con(T) which is obtained in the manner described 25 Here f(x) should be understood as abbreviating the image of the definition of the embedding f (x) given in §3.3 under the ordinal interpretation whereas T ⇤ abbreviates the class term obtained by uniformly replacing Ti with
26 Note that in this case (x) and (·) ⇤ will satisfy the following properties for all L T -sentences ', respectively as a consequence of (3.7a,e) and (3.10):
Lemma 4.1 Suppose that T and (x) are as above and ' is any L T -sentence such that T`' $ ¬ (p'q). Then if T + Con(T) is consistent, then T 6 ' and T 6 ¬'.
Proof. Let ' be such that T`' $ ¬ (p'q). We now consider the two cases: i) Suppose that T`' and thus also that T`¬ (p'q). In virtue of the former supposition and (4.1a) we also have that T + Con(T)` (p'q) and thus also T + Con(T)`?. ii) Suppose that T`¬' and thus also that T` (p'q). In virtue of the former supposition and (4.1a) we also have that T` (p¬'q). But then by (4.1b) we have T + Con(T)`¬ (p'q) and thus also T + Con(T)`?.
⇤
As a version of the Diagonal Lemma will be available for the sort of theory in question (either directly or by interpretation), it is possible to directly construct a sentence such that T` $ ¬ (p q). Since the consistency of T + Con(T) is entailed by the !-consistency of T (and in fact even by its 1-consistency), Lemma 4.1 already yields a version of Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem.
27 Now suppose M1 |= T + Con(T). Then by Theorem 3.4, there is a model M2 which is strongly defined in a M1. It thus also follows from (3.11) that M1 |= if and only if M2 6 |= . It hence follows that M1 and M2 cannot be elementarily equivalent -i.e. M1 6 ⌘ M2. Taken together with Proposition 3.5, Lemma 4.1 thus also shows that M2 not only must be an end extension of M1, but it also must additionally be proper. In particular, if M1 is the standard model N , M2 must be nonstandard.
Another consequence of Lemma 4.1 which arises from (4.1c) is the following:
Corollary 4.2 Suppose that T satisfies the same conditions as in Lemma 4.1 and that ' is such that T`' $ ¬' ⇤ . Then if T + Con(T) is consistent, then T 6 ' and T 6 ¬'
It follows that any sentence which is provably equivalent to the negation of its interpretation under (·) ⇤ must be independent of T as long as T+Con(T) is consistent. As we will see, this result is already su cient to convert many paradoxes which are traditionally described as involving self-reference into formal incompleteness theorems, in some instances without overt diagonalization.
Set theoretic paradoxes 26
In the cases where L T does not include L Z , (x) should be understood in the sequel as the image of the formula constructed in §3.3 in L Z under an appropriate interpretation. 27 A less general form of Lemma 4.1 is presented in this guise by Smorynski (1977, p. 861) whereas Corollary 4.2 (which will be of more use below) is implicitly employed by (Wang, 1955) .
Russell's paradox
The Class Theorem can be used to illustrate how the traditional set theoretic paradoxes are resolved relative to theories such as GB or S which formally distinguish between sets and classes. For instance, since ⇢(X) = X 6 2 X is a predicative formula, GB proves the existence of the class of sets which do not contain themselves as a member -i.e. GB`9Y 8x(x 2 Y $ x 6 2 x). It thus follows that there is a term R denoting the Russell class such that S`8X(M (X) ! (X 2 R $ X 6 2 X)). From this it follows that S`M (R) ! (R 2 R $ R 6 2 R) and hence also S`¬M (R). But then S`R 6 2 R -i.e. the "Russell sentence" is refutable in S. Although the language of GB does not provide a class term by which this fact can be asserted, it still proves ¬9Y (M (Y )^8x(x 2 Y $ x 6 2 x)). Thus while both GB and S prove that R exists as a class, they embody the traditional resolution to Russell's paradox in the sense that they refute that it exists as a set.
If we assume the Axiom of Regularity, then it may also be shown formally in S that no set is a member of itself and thus that R = V .
28 Recall, however, that we have seen in §3.3 that it is also possible to uniformly enumerate the namable classes over S via the L S -definable function N(x). Although there are only countably many such classes, it is also possible to formulate a version of Russell's paradox for namable classes. For consider the predicate
which holds of a finite ordinal just in case it is not a member of the class which it names. Now suppose that there existed a term
. It thus follows that if our assumption held, we would also have S`M (r 0 ) (since r 0 2 ! which is a set by Infinity) and in fact also S`M (R 0 ) (since R 0 would be a subclass of ! and hence a set by either Subclasses or Replacement).
The reductio assumption in this case is thus not that ⇢ 0 (x) determines a set, but rather that it determines a class. For note that since the definition of N(x) given in §3.4 is ⌃ 1 1 , the definition of ⇢ 0 (x) which has been given is not a predicative formula and is thus not guaranteed to form a class denoted by a term of L S . The argument just given thus demonstrates that as long as S is consistent, there can be no predicative formula which is provably equivalent to N(x) over S. In particular, we can conclude that GB does not prove that the class function denoted by N(x) is itself namable, and also that it is consistent with GB that it does not exist as a class.
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It is possible to reconstruct Kreisel's original incompleteness result for a system similar to S on the basis of a similar series of observations. To this end, let (·)
⇤ be an interpretation of S in S + Con(S) obtained in the manner of §3.3 by composing an arithmetical interpretation (·) z of S in Z + Con(S) with the ordinal interpretation (·) k of Z in S. Now consider the formula
Then (x) holds of a natural numbers just in case its image in the model determined by (·) ⇤ fails to fall under the class which it names in the sense of that model. Recall that the interpretation (·) ⇤ restricts all quantifiers by the predicate x 2 ! and note also that the definition of the function N ⇤ (x) given in §3.4 is predicative. Thus unlike ⇢ 0 (x), (x) is a predicative formula of L S .
From this it follows that for an appropriate class term K,
Since K is a fixed member of ClTermL S , there is also a natural number k such that S`N(k) = K. But in contradistinction to the situation with the modified Russell class R 0 , we have the following:
Proposition 4.3 If S + Con(S) is consistent, then S 6 k 2 K and S 6 k 6 2 K.
Proof. From (4.4) we have
It follows from (3.13) and (3.16) that the righthand side of this biconditional is equivalent to (k 2 K) ⇤ . We hence have that
And from this it follows from Corollary 4.2 that if S+Con(S) is consistent, then S 6 k 2 K and S 6 k / 2 K. ⇤ Proposition 4.3 represents a partial reconstruction of the original incompleteness result reported by Kreisel (1950, pp. 273-274) . 30 Note that the definition of K entails both that it is a set and also that the biconditional (4.6) holds. But rather than leading to the conclusion that ⇢(x) does not define a set in the manner of the original paradox or that ⇢ 0 (x) does not define a class in the manner of reformulation with namable classes, the biconditional (4.6) entails that S leaves undecided whether the number k is a member of the class which it names. This is our first instance of the pattern described above.
Other set theoretic paradoxes
Many familiar set theoretic antinomies are similar to Russell's paradox in that they can be derived by asking whether a certain class is a member of itself. For instance, the paradoxes of Burali-Forti or Mirimano↵ can be formulated over a theory such as GB (or S) as follows: i) the relevant set theoretic notions -i.e. ordinal number and well-founded -can be formalized as L S -formulas Ord(X) and W F (X) which respectively hold of the sets which are ordinals or are well-founded ; ii) as these formulas are predicative, they determine classes O and W ; iii) under the assumptions M (O) or M (W ), it can be shown that the self-membership claims O 2 O and W 2 W would hold in virtue of the fact that O and W satisfy the definitions of ordinality or well-foundedness; iv) but this can also be shown to contradict the definitions of Ord(X) and W F (X).
On the other hand, a notable di↵erence between these cases and Russell's paradox is that the formulas conventionally chosen for Ord(X) and W F (X) do not instantiate schema which are inconsistent over pure first order logic.
31 In fact, the typical formulations of the Burali-Forti and Mirimano↵ paradoxes require us to choose particular formulas defining ordinality or well-foundedness which in turn require the adoption of additional 30 One obstacle to providing an exact reconstruction of Kreisel's (1950) original result is that he initially failed to provide an axiomatization of the system for which he intended it to hold. Although axiomatization of a system similar to S is given in (Kreisel, 1953) , a more serious obstacle is that Kreisel also does not explicitly define the functions f (x) or N (x) which we have seen are required to refer to objects in the model defined by (·) ⇤ . It is thus not clear from his proof why K should correspond to a set in the system in which he is operating. For more on Kreisel's original proof, see note 55 below. 31 Recall in particular that the instance of Comprehension required to derive Russell's paradox has the form 9x8y('(x, y) $ ¬'(y, y)) (taking x 2 y for '(x, y)), all instances of which are refutable in first-order logic.
set theoretic axioms in order to derive the relevant contradictions. 32 As a consequence, it is less straightforward to transform these paradoxes directly into incompleteness results.
A case of intermediate complexity is provided by Quine's (1981, p. 130 ) paradox of reciprocated classes. Consider the family of predicates 0(x) = x 6 2 x and for n > 0 (4.7)
n(x) = ¬9y1 . . . yn(x 2 y1^y1 2 y2^. . .^yn 1 2 yn^yn 2 x) For each n, n(x) holds of those sets x which do not contain an 2-cycle of length n. As i(x) is predicative, S proves the existence of the class Ui determined by each predicate i(x). But it is also easy to see that S proves U0 = R and thus also ¬M (U0). The fact that S`¬M (Ui) for i 1 illustrates the general pattern of reasoning required to formally derive ¬M (O) or ¬M (W ).
33 By way of example, consider the case for n = 1 and assume for reductio that M (U1). From this it follows that
Reasoning in S, we may now proceed as follows:
ii) Then ¬9y(U1 2 y^y 2 U1) by (4.8).
iii) From i) we have U1 2 U1^U1 2 U1. But by generalizing we obtain 9y(U1 2 y^y 2 U1) contradicting ii).
iv) Suppose U1 6 2 U1. v) Then 9y(U1 2 y^y 2 U1) by (4.8). vi) If we fix y such that U1 2 y^y 2 U1 it then follows that 9z(z 2 y^y 2 z). vii) Since y 2 U1, ¬9z(z 2 y^y 2 z) by (4.8) again. But this contradicts vi).
As an intermediate step in developing an arithmetized version of this paradox, note that it is again possible to formulate a version of this reasoning for the namable classes analogous to the second version of the Russell antinomy presented above. Consider in particular the predicate (4.9)
which is obtained from 1(x) in the same manner by which ⇢ 0 (x) is obtained from ⇢(x) above. If we were to assume for reductio that In order to obtain an incompleteness result analogous to Proposition 4.3, we now wish to replicate the forgoing reasoning under the scope of an interpretation obtained from the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem. But we will see that this requires that we are 32 See (Doets, 1999) for a discussion of the additional principles which are required in these cases. 33 In fact the paradox of reciprocated classes can be understood as a simplification of Montague's (1955) paradox of grounded classes which in turn can be understood as a simplification of Mirimano↵ paradoxes which avoids the need to formalize the notion of finitude. Montague's version arises when we consider the class of all grounded sets satisfying the predicate ↵(x) = 8u(x 2 u ! 9y(y 2 u^¬9z(z 2 u^z 2 y)) which holds of x just in case all sets u containing x have the property which is asserted to hold of all sets by the Axiom of Regularity -i.e. if u is non-empty, then it contains a y such that y \ u = ;. A similar incompleteness result can be obtained via a more involved version of the argument illustrated by Proposition 4.4 below.
able to show that there is a term witnessing the existential quantifier in the statement 9y(U1 2 y^y 2 U1) appearing in the original proof. In light of this, we will work over S + = S + V = L and consider an interpretation (·) ⇤ of S + in S + + Con(S + ) obtained as in §4.2. Next consider the predicate (4.10)
which is obtained from 0 2 (x) in the same manner that (x) is obtained from ⇢ 0 (x) in the proof of Proposition 4.3. As 1(x) is predicative, it follows that there is a class term B1 such that S`8x(x 2 B2 $ 1(x)) and b1 2 ! such that S`N(b1) = B1. We can now formulate the following:
Proposition 4.4 Suppose S + + Con(S + ) is consistent. Then S 6 b1 2 B1 and S 6 b1 6 2 B1.
Proof. As in the case of Proposition 4.3, S +`B 1 ✓ ! and thus S +`M (B1). Applying definition (4.10), we obtain (4.11) S
Now suppose that S +`b 1 2 B1 and thus also S
⇤ . But this entails that S + + Con(S + )`?. On the other hand suppose that S
As (x) is predicative, there is some class term T such that S +`8 x( (x) $ x 2 T )^T 6 = ;. But since such a class is nameable, it follows by Theorem 3.7 that S +`A s(T ) 2 T . From this it follows that (4.12)
From the second conjunct we obtain S +`( As(T ) 2 B1) ⇤ which is in turn equivalent to S +`( 1(As(T )))
⇤ . But now note that by permuting the conjuncts of (4.12) and generalizing we also have (4.13)
But then also (4.14)
But this is equivalent to S + + Con(S)`(¬ 1(As(T ))) ⇤ . We thus again conclude that S + + Con(S + )`?.
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⇤ 34 Note that the need to work over S + V = L rather than S arises here because the reasoning embodied by steps iv)-vii) of the original paradox requires us to expand the definition of U1 twice -the first time to conclude that there is some y such that U1 2 y^y 2 U1 and the second to conclude that y is such that 9z(z 2 y^y 2 z). (This is also a feature of several other set theoretic paradoxes -inclusive of those of BuraliForti and Mimirano↵ -which appears to distinguish them from that of Russell.) When formalizing the sort of reasoning at issue in the arithmetized setting, we are thus faced with the need to refer to classes defined relative to two iterations of the interpretation (·) ⇤ . As the proof of Proposition 4.4 illustrates, one means of ensuring that we are able to keep track of classes across the models which are defined by (·) ⇤ is to adopt an assumption such as V = L which is su cient to ensure that they are denoted by terms.
4.3. Semantic paradoxes As I will return to discuss in §5.2, the second version of Russell's paradox illustrates a moral about predicative definability which in turn can be understood to relate directly to the semantic paradoxes. It was, however, via a di↵erent route by which Kreisel (1953, p. 47 ) first hinted at the possibility of using a truth definition for arithmetic to obtain an incompleteness result in a manner similar to Proposition 4.3. Such a construction was first carried out by Wang (1955) . But at this time the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem had only been stated in the form of Theorem 3.2 and not in the form of Theorem 3.4. For whereas the proof of the former result sketched above constructs the interpretation (·) z from (x) via (3.8), the original proof given by Hilbert & Bernays (1939, §4. 2) from which Wang worked constructed the predicates defining the non-logical terms of L T one at a time in the manner of Gödel's original completeness proof.
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Wang's approach to the paradoxes may thus be understood as a direct continuation of the strategy initiated by Hilbert & Bernays in the Grundlagen. In particular, he first adapted the truth definition Tr(x) for L Z in L 2 Z which Hilbert and Bernays had given in (1939, §5.2e) to a set theoretic system similar to S. He then employed Theorem 3.2 to obtain an interpretation (·)
⇤ of S in S + Con(S) in the same manner as Kreisel (1950) . In this way he obtained an interpretation Tr ⇤ (x) of the truth predicate in the arithmetical fragment of L S . Wang then went on to observe that when the primitive truth predicate W(x) which Hilbert & Bernays had employed in their axiomatic treatment of the paradoxes in §5.1a is replaced with Tr ⇤ (x), the Liar-like sentence constructed in the same manner becomes undecidable in S. This result can thus be understood to further bear out Hilbert & Bernays's prediction in (1939, §5.1c ) that when the concepts involved in formulating the Liar are formalized mathematically, the paradox is transformed into a formal incompleteness result.
A second-order truth definition
In order to reconstruct and generalize this method, it will be useful to work not over S but rather a theory of second-order arithmetic which is closer to that over which Hilbert & Bernays formulated their original truth definition. Many of the observations which are required to carry out this task pertain to the expressibility of the truth definition in L 2 Z rather than the ability of a given theory to prove that the corresponding set of true L Z -sentences exists. There is thus some flexibility in the choice of subsystems of Z2 which may be used to carry out the formalization. However the theory ACA0 suggests itself not only because it conservatively extends PA in the same manner as GB extends ZF, but also because it is similar to the system in which Hilbert & Bernays proposed to formalize analysis in Supplement IV of (1939).
Turning to the task of formulating the truth definition, recall first that already in L Z we can define an evaluation function val(x) for closed L Z -terms such that ACA0`val(ptq) = t. Also let ClTermL Z (x) formalize that x is the Gödel number of a closed term of L Z and ⌃ Recall that if T and (x) are as in §3.3, then (x) can be understood as providing a truth definition for a model M2 which is strongly definable in M1 |= T + Con(T) while on the other hand (·) z only directly provides an interpretation of the atomic formulas of L T . Thus while Theorem 3.4 can be understood as providing a characterization of the elementary diagram of M1, Theorem 3.2 only directly provides a characterization of its atomic diagram. 36 Here expressions such as x · p=q · y are used to abbreviate the Gödel number of the sentence formed by concatenating the term Gödel numbered by x with the Gödel number of the equality sign and the term Gödel numbered by y. A similar truth definition is presented by Hilbert & Bernays (1939, p. 333-334/347 ). This may be
We can now specify a ⌃ Tr(x) = df 9X9y(⌧ (y, X)^x 2 X)
By an external induction on the complexity of formulas, it may now be shown that Tr(x) satisfies Tarski's Convention T in the sense that for all L Z -sentences '
This definition may additionally be shown to satisfy the standard Tarskian compositional clauses -i.e. for all L Z -sentences ',
are provable in ACA0.
These observations suggest both that the language L 2 Z is su ciently expressive to provide a natural formalization of first-order arithmetical truth and that the theory ACA0 is su cient to show that it demonstrates at least some of the adequacy conditions which are traditionally imposed on such definitions. I will return to discuss some additional desiderata which bear on such a determination in §5.1 and §5.5.
The Liar
If (x) is a formula defining a Henkin-complete extension of ACA0 constructed in the manner of §3.3, then we have seen in §4.1 that it is possible to obtain an undecidable sentence such that Z` $ ¬ (p q) by applying the Diagonal Lemma directly to ¬ (x). We have also seen how (x) provides a truth definition for a model M2 |= ACA0 which is strongly definable relative to another model M1 |= ACA0 + Con(ACA0). may thus be likened to a Liar sentence in the sense that it is true in M1 if and only if it is false in M2.
The availability of the truth definition Tr(x) provides also another means of approaching the status of the Liar. For since the scope of (4.16) is limited to first-order sentences (i.e. those of L Z ), the existence of a second-order formula (i.e. one of L 2 Z ) defining firstorder arithmetical truth in the sense of (4.16) does not violate Tarski's undefinability compared with the informal description of a formal truth definition for type theory previously provided by Tarski (1935) (see p. 195 and p. 255 in Tarski, 1956 ). Relative to the terminology which was adopted later, what Hilbert and Bernays showed is that True Arithmetic -i.e. the set T A of first-order statements true in the standard model of L Z -is implicitly definable in the sense that there exists an L 2 Z -formula with no bound second-order variables and a single free second-order variable X which is uniquely satisfied by T A in the standard model of L 2 Z . This can be shown to be equivalent to the fact that T A is 1 1 -definable in L 2 Z -see, e.g., (Rogers, 1987 , §15.1.XII). Kreisel & Wang (1955, p. 104) In order to assess the status of Tr, something more must be said about what is meant by "the" Diagonal Lemma. In its simplest form, this result provides a means of constructing for every formula '(x) of the language of a theory T interpreting a weak fragment of arithmetic a sentence ' such that T` ' $ '(p 'q). There are a number of formally distinct means by which ' can be e↵ectively constructed from '(x).
37 But what matters for present purposes is how the syntactic complexity of ' varies with that of '(x). In order to simplify the discussion, it will thus be useful to assume that this is achieved in the "canonical" manner by taking ' = '(subst(m, m)) where m = p'(subst(x, x))q.
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In this case the sentence Tr obtained by applying the diagonalization procedure to ¬Tr(x) will be equivalent to a ⇧ 1 1 -formula of L Z .
39 And thus since Tr can be taken to begin with the prefix "8X" it will not fall under Form 0 y (x) for any y. This purely syntactic observation can be formalized in ACA0 from which it follows that ACA0`¬Tr(p Trq) and thus also ACA0` Tr. But of course no inconsistency follows from these facts. For since Tr is not an L Z -sentence, the fact that ACA0` Tr does not entail ACA0`Tr(p Trq) since (4.16) only holds for L Z -sentences. And although we have obtained the sentence Tr via a specific diagonalization procedure, it is also easy to see that no fixed point of ¬Tr(x) can be provably equivalent to an L Z -sentence provided that ACA0 is consistent.
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As was originally observed by Kleene (1943, p. 64) , in this way the Liar is mathematically repurposed as a means of demonstrating the non-collapse of the arithmetical and analytical hierarchies.
The situation is di↵erent when we first use Theorem 3.2 to obtain an arithmetical interpretation of L 2 Z and then diagonalize on the image of the second-order truth predicate.
To see this let (·)
⇤ : L 2 Z ! L Z be an interpretation of ACA0 in ACA0 +Con(ACA0) obtained in the manner of Theorem 3.2 and f(x) the definable embedding given by Proposition 3.5. Also recall that Tr ⇤ (x) denotes the result of applying the inductive clauses in the definition of (·) ⇤ to the formula Tr(x) while treating x as a free variable. By applying the Diagonal Lemma to Tr ⇤ (f(x)) we can now obtain a sentence Tr ⇤ such that
We can now record the following:
Proposition 4.5 If ACA0 + Con(ACA0) is consistent, then ACA0 6 Tr ⇤ and ACA0 6 ¬ Tr ⇤ .
Proof. Since the range of (·)
⇤ is L Z , it follows that ¬Tr ⇤ (f(x)) is an arithmetical formula from which it follows that Tr ⇤ is an arithmetical sentence. We thus have that ACA0T r(p Tr ⇤ q) $ Tr ⇤ . Putting this together with (4.19) yields ACA0`Tr(p Tr ⇤ q) $ 37 See, e.g., (Halbach & Visser, 2014a ) for a discussion of various alternatives. 38 See, e.g., Smoryński, 1985, p. 6) . 39 This is immediate if we assume that the language includes the substitution function subst(x, y). But even without this assumption, Tr can still be taken to be of the form 9z(✓(k, k, y)^'(z)) where ✓(x, y, z) is a ⌃ 0 1 -formula representing substitution and k = p9y(✓(x, x, y)^'(y))q. In this case Tr will have the form 9z(✓(k, k, z)^¬Tr(z)) which is provably equivalent to a ⇧ 1 1 -formula. 40 For by an external induction on the lengths of proofs, we can show that if ACA0` 1 $ 2 then ACA0`Tr(p 1 $ 2q) and thus also ACA0`Tr(p 1q) $ Tr(p 2q). Thus if ACA0` $ Tr for 2 L Z , then ACA0`Tr(p q) $ Tr(p Trq). But now combining (4.18) and ACA0`Tr(p q) $ (since 2 L Z ), we would have ACA0`?. 
The Grelling-Nelson Paradox
The paradox concerning the notion heterological -i.e. the property possessed by an adjective which does not apply to itself -was first presented by Nelson & Grelling (1908) . Ramsey (1926, p. 353) later grouped it along with the Liar amongst his list of "epistemological" paradoxes. On the other hand Russell (1903, p. 80) had already presented a similar contradiction by considering the notion of predicability -i.e. the property possessed by an expression just in case it is able to serve as a predicate. On this basis, both Nelson and Grelling (1908, pp. 60-61) and Hilbert (1917, pp. 193-194) , (1928, pp. 890-891) presented this as leading to a paradox about sets which they explicitly liken to that of Russell. Although I will develop this parallel further in §5.2, it may also be observed that such a classification is in the spirit of Hilbert & Bernays's treatment of the paradoxes in the Grundlagen. For as we have seen, they took the subject matter of what they termed "metamathematics" to subsume not only syntactic notions like provability, but also semantic ones such as truth and denotation. Although he does not mention the paradox by name, Kreisel (1950, p. 280-281) later observed in passing that reasoning similar to that of the Grelling-Nelson antinomy can be used to give an alternative reconstruction of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem.
41 But it should also not be surprising that this paradox can be directly converted into an incompleteness result by employing the method of arithmetization.
First note that once we have given a truth definition for L Z in L 2 Z , it is straightforward to also define the satisfaction relation for L Z formulas and closed terms. In particular, if '(x) is an L Z -formula and t is a closed L Z -term, then we can define Sat(p'(x)q, ptq) = df Tr(subst(p'(x)q, ptq)). We then can show
for all L Z -formulas and closed terms t. This allows for a natural formalization of the predicate heterological as Het(x) = df ¬Sat(x, x).
If we now let h = pHet(x)q then the statement appearing in the Grelling-Nelson paradox is expressible as the L 2 Z -sentence Het(h) asserting that Het(x) does not hold of the numeral corresponding to its own Gödel number. But it should not come as a surprise that the paradox is averted in this case in the sense that ACA0`Het(phq). For note that this sentence is equivalent to ¬Tr(p¬Tr(pHet(h)q)q). But this is in turn equivalent to the assertion that Tr(x) fails to hold of the Gödel number of a ⇧ 1 1 -formula -a fact which is again provable in ACA0 simply in virtue of the syntactic form of ¬Tr(pHet(phq)q).
41 For suppose we have set up a bijective Gödel numbering of L Z -formulas with one free variable leading to an enumeration '0(x), '1(x), . . . Then the formula ¬Prov Z (p'ẋ(ẋ)q) will appear as 'q(x) for some q 2 N. It thus follows that 'q(q) is equivalent to " Z = df ¬Prov Z (p¬Prov Z (p'ẋ(ẋ)q)q) for which it can in turn be shown that Z" Z $ ¬Prov Z (p" Z q) -i.e. " Z is a Gödel sentence for Z and is thus undecidable in Z (presuming it is !-consistent). When understood in this way, the Gödel sentence bears a natural resemblance to the statement arising in the Grelling-Nelson paradox. For say a formula 'n(x) is autoprovable if it is provable in Z that 'n(x) holds of p'n(x)q -i.e. Prov Z (p'n(p'n(x)q)q) -and heteroprovable otherwise. Then the statement " Z just described can be seen as asserting that the property of being heteroprovable is hetereprovable. But this is just another means of asserting that " Z expresses its own unprovability. See Kripke (2014) for a similar reconstruction.
But consider now the formula
Letting h ⇤ = pHet ⇤ (x)q, we have the following:
Proposition 4.6 If ACA0 + Con(ACA0) is consistent, then ACA0 6 Het ⇤ (ph ⇤ q) and ACA0 6 ¬Het ⇤ (ph ⇤ q).
Proof. Note that Het ⇤ (ph ⇤ q) is provably equivalent to ¬Sat ⇤ (f(pHet ⇤ (x)q), f(ph ⇤ q)) by (4.21) and thus also to (¬Sat(pHet ⇤ (x)q, ph ⇤ q)) ⇤ by (3.13). On the other hand ACAS at(pHet Both the present paper and Gödel (1931b) use the diagonal (non-enumerability) argument to construct undecided propositions. Though this point is obvious, it seems worth mentioning: for one thing it connects undecidability proofs which are usually referred to as paradoxes and self references, with a familiar technique of mathematics, and, roughly speaking, allows one to convert non-enumerability proofs into those of undecidability. But also it throws light on the diagonal argument, and its "permissibility" e.g. Borel (1898).
In commenting on his generalizations of Kreisel's result, Wang (1955, p. 32 ) went a step further in relating formal incompleteness to di↵erent means of resolving the paradoxes:
These results, it is hoped, will throw some new light on the semantic paradoxes. Moreover, like the result of Kreisel (1950) , the conclusions are also of interest in that they connect indefinable classes and relations with undecidable sentences. There seems to be a certain similarity between this situation and the possibility of two di↵erent methods of avoiding mathematical paradoxes: the usual way of refusing to countenance a class R of all classes which are not self-members, and the alternative approach of admitting such a class R but treating as undecidable the question whether R belongs to R.
These passages suggest that both Kreisel and Wang regarded the paradoxes as originating from a common source which is not overtly metamathematical in character.
42 In 42 Kreisel's allusion to Borel appears to refer to pp. 107-109 of (1898). In this section Borel first presents and then critiques Cantor's use of an enumeration of the characteristic functions of the subsets of a given set E in order to show its powerset is of cardinality greater than E. (Borel's complaint was that although Cantor's method can be used to show that the set of discontinuous functions on R is of cardinality greater than that of the continuum, it does not provide a means by which we can conceive of the elements of this set.) Kreisel additionally refers (1950, p. 280) Lebesgue's (1905) and Lusin's (1925) use of light of this, Wang's further proposal can be understood as o↵ering a choice between two alternatives: i) on the one hand, it is possible to regard the paradoxes as arising from the misapplication of definitions which, when properly understood, fail to determine sets; ii) on the other hand, it is also possible to understand the definitions in question as determining classes but doing so in a manner such that paradoxical reasoning is blocked by the undecidability of particular statements about membership. The results of §4 are indeed suggestive that formal undecidability might play a role in a uniform response to the paradoxes in the manner of Wang's second alternative. A thorough philosophical evaluation of this proposal is beyond the scope of the present paper. However in the remainder of this section, I will explore five questions which such an approach would need to confront were it to be further articulated: 1) How are the undecidability results in question related to Hilbert & Bernays's original concerns about proving the consistency of infinitary mathematics by finitary means? 2) Does the approach of §4 in fact lead to a unification of the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes? 3) Is it reasonable to regard the undecidable statements obtained there as genuinely indeterminate in truth value (which, as we will see, Kreisel appears to have thought)? 4) Should these results be regarded as extensional or intensional in the sense of Feferman (1960, §1)? 5) How do the methods and results developed in §4 interface with more recent work on axiomatic theories of truth?
Resolution?
The developments surveyed in §2 - §4 illustrate a pathway from the paradoxes to the phenomenon of formal incompleteness. Hilbert & Bernays devoted much of the second volume of the Grundlagen to expositing Gödel's incompleteness theorems and investigating their interaction with various proof theoretic methods. In the first volume, however, it is the problem of ensuring that theories su cient for the development of analysis are free from contradiction which sets the tone for their exposition of the finitary standpoint. In fact it was this concern which led them to propose the method of arithmetization described in §2:
We are therefore forced to investigate the consistency of theoretical systems without considering actuality, and thus we find ourselves already at the standpoint of formal axiomatics. Now, one usually treats this problem -both in geometry and the disciplines of physics -with the method of arithmetization. The objects of a theory are represented by numbers or systems of numbers and the basic relations by equations or inequations, such that, on the basis of this translation, the axioms of the theory turn out either as arithmetical identities or provable sentences . . . or as a system of conditions whose joint satisfiability can be demonstrated via arithmetical existence sentences. (1939, p. 3/3) Comparison of Hilbert & Bernays's informal description of the method of arithmetization (1934, pp. 18-19/18-19) with their presentation of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem (1939, pp. 234-253/243-263) suggests that they ultimately came to regard the latter as a mathematical embodiment of the former. And although no further use of this result is made in the Grundlagen itself, Bernays (1954a, §19) later presented a detailed construction of an arithmetical model of GB = GB -Infinty using techniques similar to those of §3.3. Although this theory does not entail the existence of infinite sets, it does prove the existence of infinite classes -e.g. that of all finite ordinals. And as is shown by Bernays (1942) , it also allows for a development similar to that proposed at the end of the Grundlagen. As such, GB is typical of the theories which Hilbert & Bernays's spoke diagonal arguments to demonstrate hierarchy theorems for point classes in descriptive set theory. of as involving "idealization [which] . . . transcends the realm of experience and intuitive self-evidence" (1939, p. 3/3) .
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It is thus notable that Bernays described his construction of an arithmetical model of GB via the Henkin method as "establish[ing] in a constructive sense" (1954a, p. 93) the consistency of GB within "the frame of the number theoretic formal system Z of Grundlagen der Mathematik with certain additions" (1954a, p. 88) (where the "additions" in question consist of various extensions by definition). This terminology reflects on the one hand that the construction does indeed provide a relative consistency proof for GB in PA.
44 And on the other, it reflects that by this point Bernays had independently come to accept results in infinitary proof-theory as providing su cient evidence to secure the consistency of first-order arithmetic.
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Bernays's comments on the method of arithmetization stand in contrast to the evaluation of the consistency proof for PA using the truth definition Tr(x) which is presented in the Grundlagen (1939, §5.2e). This is a rendition of the (now) familiar "semantic argument" for the consistency of PA -i.e. if it can be shown that the axioms of PA fall under Tr(x) and that the rules of first-order logic preserve truth, then it is also possible to demonstrate the global reflection principle for PA
and thus also its consistency.
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Hilbert & Bernays describe the semantic argument after their proof of the second incompleteness theorem in order to address the question of whether the introduction of "bound formula variables" is required to prove the consistency of PA (1939, p. 329/342) . This argument can indeed be formalized in a system of second-order arithmetic in which it is possible to either prove the existence of a class corresponding to the extension of Tr(x) or in which induction can be directly performed on predicates defined in terms of this formula.
47 But as was observed by Mostowski (1950) in the set theoretic case, this 43 This is how Hilbert & Bernays described the sorts of infinitary systems which arise in the axiomatization of geometry and physics alluded to in the passage cited above. The use of the expression "method of arithmetization" in the Grundlagen should thus not be understood simply as a redescription of Gödel's arithmetization of syntax (although it is reasonable to suppose Bernays came to view this as an application of the method). Rather it is intended to describe the more general use of arithmetical models which Hilbert had first employed in his consistency and independence proofs for various systems of geometry in (1899) and axiomatizations of physics in (1916) . See also (Bernays, 1930, p. 253 ) for a related description. 44 Recall that PA corresponds to the system which Hilbert & Bernays call Z. The full system is needed for Bernays's result whose proof is similar to the model expansion argument which was introduced by Novak (1950) to prove the relative consistency of GB over ZF. 45 This topic is explored in (1939, §5.3) wherein Hilbert & Bernays present Gentzen's (1936) consistency proof in the context of considering potential extensions of the finitary standpoint as characterized at the beginning of the Grundlagen. It is also evident from Bernays's later philosophical writings (e.g. Bernays, 1954b ) that he grew increasingly sympathetic to consistency proofs based on transfinite induction and other broadly constructive techniques. 46 In fact Hilbert & Bernays (1939, p. 338/351-352) provide what is apparently the first explicit statement of the global reflection principle as well as sketching the semantic argument for PA in a system similar to second-order arithmetic. See (Dean, 2015) for discussion of the subsequent reception and significance of these developments. 47 The theory 1 1 -CA0 is su cient relative to the former criterion. A theory which is su cient relative to the latter is the system ACA in which the induction axiom of ACA0 is replaced by the full-second order induction scheme.
argument cannot be used to prove the consistency of ZF in a second-order system such as GB which provides only predicative comprehension.
48 It is easy to see that the same is true for ACA0 with respect to PA. Such an observation is in line with Hilbert & Bernays's remark that their proof of (5.1) is "not of finitary character" (1939, p. 338/351) . And they went on to contend that the second-order definability of Tr(x) does not provide a means of determining whether this formula holds of arbitrary L Z -sentences nor does it supply finitary justification for the application of tertium non datur to number theoretic reasoning (1939, pp. 338-339/351) .
In regard to the latter point, Mostowski later observed that "since the 'whole theory of truth' makes it possible to prove the consistency of a system for which the notion of satisfaction has been defined, we infer that certain properties of the notion for [ZF] cannot be established in [GB]" (1950, p. 112) . On the other hand, Mostowski also remarked that GB provides a "good" (p. 118) theory of truth in the sense that it allows us to derive all of the T-biconditionals (4.16) and compositional clauses (4.17) for Tr(x) as schema for L Z -sentences. But the inability of such a theory to formalize the semantic argument is a manifestation of the fact that it does not prove the uniform version of the compositional clause for negation -i.e.
As a consequence, ACA0 also does not prove the uniform version of the law of the excluded middle with respect to Tr(x) -i.e. 8x(SentL Z (x) ! (Tr(x) _ Tr(¬x))).
One might conclude on this basis that such systems provide "highly incomplete" theories of truth relative to the standards which Tarski (1956, p. 257) ultimately appears to have advocated.
49 But Hilbert & Bernays's investigation of the truth predicate was not motivated by a desire to study its (putative) role in informal reasoning in the style of more recent axiomatic theories of truth which I will discuss further in §5.5. For as we have just seen, they put little stock in the use of a second-order truth definition in a formal consistency proof. And on the other hand, we have also seen that their original presentation of the paradoxes in (1939, §5.1a) was not intended to highlight the role of the axiomatic approach as such but rather to serve the expository role of showing how the formalization of the Liar leads to incompleteness rather than formal inconsistency.
Hilbert & Bernays originally expanded on this point in (1939, §5.1b,c) by showing in the (now) familiar manner that the formalization of the proof of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem leads to his second incompleteness theorem. But we have seen that a similar moral can be reached more directly by applying the method of arithmetization to a theory like ACA0 over which it is possible to formalize a truth definition for L Z -sentences by a ⌃ ⇤ of ACA0 in (e.g.) PA + Con(ACA0) which is in turn similar to that employed in Bernay's relative consistency proof for GB . As we have seen, the Liar-like sentence Tr ⇤ which may then be obtained by diagonalizing on Tr ⇤ (x) is indeed undecidable in ACA0 (and, mutatis muntandis, over stronger theories as well).
We thus reach the conclusion that when the method of arithmetization is applied to interpret the "idealizing assumption" embodied by the use of impredicative second-order quantification involved in the truth definition, the fear that an inconsistency in the style of the Liar will arise is abated by the undecidability of Tr ⇤ . Note that this point remains 48 Tarski (1935, p. 317, p. 359) (p. 198, p. 237 in the English translation in (1956)) also mentions the possibility of providing a similar consistency proof using his own truth definition. But he later added a footnote (1956, p. 237) acknowledging Mostowski's result and the necessity of employing a metatheory which is su ciently strong to formalize the relevant induction. 49 See (Halbach, 2011, §3) for a recent re-endorsement of this view. even if we take ourselves to lack finitary evidence for the consistency of a theory like ACA0 or GB . For although we must assume the formal consistency statement for such a theory in order to apply the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem, doing so allows us to see how the antinomies which might originally have made us suspicious about consistency are transformed not into contradictions but rather instances of formal incompleteness.
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As we have seen, a similar route to Wang's second alternative may also be distilled from the set theoretic paradoxes by constructing arithmetical interpretations of systems similar to GB in the manner of Bernays's (1954a) proof. But at least two questions remain: 1) does such an approach point to a unification of the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes? 2) are the independent sentences which are constructed in this manner decidable on the basis of further mathematical considerations or do they represent a di↵erent or more abiding form of incompleteness?
5.2. Unification? The first step of the method outlined at the beginning of §4 for transforming paradoxes into incompleteness results was to show how the relevant "paradoxical notions" -e.g. that of non-self membership, ordinality, truth, or satisfaction -can be formalized in the language of a two-sorted theory such as GB or ACA0. These systems make a distinction of type -e.g. between sets or numbers and classes -and order -e.g. between predicative and impredicative formulas. It is thus not surprising that the resolutions of Russell's paradox and the Liar which they provide are similar to the type-theoretic resolution originally envisioned by Russell (1908) and later extended by Tarski (1935) in terms of a hierarchy of metalanguages.
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To briefly review the initial parallels:
1) The predicate ⇢(x) = x 6 2 x defines a class R over GB. On the other hand, GB refutes the formula M (R) asserting that R is a set. Thus although GB`R 6 2 R, this does not lead to a contradiction since the definition of R only allows us to infer X 2 R from X 6 2 R in the case that X is a set. 2) The language of second-order arithmetic may be used as a metalanguage for that of first-order arithmetic in the sense that there is an L 2 Z -formula Tr(x) which provably satisfies Tarski's Convention T for L Z -formulas over ACA0. On the other hand, the Liar sentence Tr for this predicate is not a L Z formula. Thus although ACA0¬
Tr(p Trq), this does not lead to a contradiction since the definition of Tr(x) only allows us to infer ¬' from ¬Tr(p'q) in the case where ' 2 L Z .
The definability of the naming function N(x) for predicative classes discussed above allows us to extend these parallels in what is now likely to be an expected direction. Note first that we can modify our prior definition of N(x) to obtain a definition of a function Na(x) which enumerates only arithmetical classes which may be proven to be subsets !. 50 Of course the question remains as to whether Hilbert or any of his interlocutors ever took seriously the possibility that the sort of theories of second order arithmetic in which they sought to formalize analysis might have been inconsistent. On one side of this issue was Weyl (1918, p. 21 ) who had famously remarked that impredicative definitions of real numbers trap us "in an endless circle, in absurdities and contradictions entirely analogous to Russell's well-known paradox . . ." However neither in (Weyl, 1918) nor in (Weyl, 1919) does he describe a concrete means by which such an analogy might be exploited to yield a contradiction in a theory such as Z2 or one of its subsystems. And in apparent response Hilbert (1922 Hilbert ( , vol 2., p. 1118 ) made clear just how dubious he regarded this claim: "[T]he paradoxes of set theory cannot be regarded as proving that the concept of a set of integers leads to contradictions. On the contrary: all our mathematical experience speaks for the correctness and consistency of this concept." 51 See (Church, 1976) for further comparison of Russell's and Tarski's resolutions to the paradoxes.
In parallel, we can also set up an indexing of predicative L S -formulas '0(x), '1(x), . . . defining arithmetical classes such that all n 2 N
Following Mostowski (1950) we can additionally carry out the definitions of truth and satisfaction given in §4.3 in S as well as in ACA0. Putting these observations together allows us to define a satisfaction predicate Sat S (x, y) based on the indexing of formulas determined by Na(x) such that
Now consider the predicate ⇢a(x) = x 2 !^x 6 2 Na(x) and observe that S`8x(⇢a(x) $ x 2 !^¬Sat S (x, x)). As was the case for the predicate ⇢ 0 (x) considered in §4.2, if Na(x) were predicatively definable, ⇢a(x) would be as well. And from this it would also follow that ⇢a(x) ⌘ 'j(x) for some j 2 N. In this case 'j(n) would hold just in case ¬Sats(n, n) -i.e. if the predicate 'n(x) failed to hold of the number naming the class which it defined. But this is just another way of saying that 'j(x) is heterological in the sense defined in §4.3.3. By taking n = j we would thus have S`Sat S (j, j) $ ¬Sat S (j, j) by (5.4). This illustrates just how closely the Russell and Grelling-Nelson antinomies are related in the context of two-sorted set theories like S or GB which have the capacity to formalize the naming relation. But it also illustrates how the type-theoretic distinction between sets and classes imposed by these theories relates to the order-theoretic distinction between predicative and impredicative definitions.
In contrast to this, the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem can be viewed as collapsing the distinction between both order and type on which the many familiar resolutions of the paradoxes depend. By way of illustration, suppose that T is a theory of second-order arithmetic such as ACA0 formulated over
provided by Theorem 3.2. In this case, the image of an L 2 Z -formula ' -i.e. one which potentially contains bound second-order variables -will be a first-order L Z -formula ' ⇤ . In particular, quantifiers of the form 8X . . . and 9X . . . in ' will thus be replaced with first-order quantifiers restricted by an appropriate domain predicate of the form 8x( 2(x) ! . . .) and 9x( 2(x)^. . .) in ' ⇤ .
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Recall that in three of the four cases we have considered, the statements shown to be undecidable via arithmetized completeness constructions are provably equivalent over T to the negation of their own interpretation under (·) ⇤ -i.e. they are instances of the schema
⇤ 52 ACA0 can be viewed as representing the first in a hierarchy of systems defined by adjoining to PA comprehension principles for formulas with bound variables ranging only over numbers (which determine level one classes), with bound variables ranging only over level one classes (which determine level two classes), . . . the union of which Church (1956, §58) refers to as ramified second-order arithmetic. In this setting it is possible to draw a partial analogy between the function served by Russell's Axiom of Reducibility and the statement of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem. The relevant version of the former would state that for every impredicatively defined leveln class, there exists a coextensive level 1-class. On the other hand, if (·)
It is easy to see that A and A ⇤ must coincide extensionally for all n 2 N for which ACA0 decides the truth value of '(n). But it follows from the existence of sets K from Proposition 4.3 that there will be cases in which A and A ⇤ are provably non-coextensive.
This can be understood to reflect the conventional classification of the Russell, Liar, and Grelling-Nelson antinomies as paradoxes of self-reference. 53 But via arithmetization it is also possible to understand these paradoxes semantically in the sense that (·)
⇤ strongly defines a model of M2 |= T relative to a model M1 |= T + Con(T). As we have seen, the relevant undecidable statements can also be interpreted as asserting of themselves that they are true in M1 if and only if they are false in M2. And thus if we are willing to assume Con(T), the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem can also be understood as showing that it is possible to describe consistent situations in which the statements on either side of the biconditionals are true.
This also illustrates the sort of dissolution of the paradoxes in virtue of undecidability which Wang appears to have envisioned. Suppose, for instance, that the Liar sentence is understood to arise not from a defined formula like Tr(x), but rather from a primitive predicate T(x) intended to express the "everyday" or "naive" notion of truth about which we are attempting to reason axiomatically. As I will discuss further in §5.5, it is often said in this context that there is no reason to prefer the truth of one side of the resulting Liar biconditional T over the other and thus also no reason to expect that a theory of truth should decide the truth value of T. This suggests that the undecidability of Tr ⇤ is consistent with our expectations about the resolution of the Liar.
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In the case of Russell's paradox, however, the iterative conception of set partially codified by the Axiom of Regularity gives us independent grounds for rejecting the existence of self-membered sets and thus for deciding in favor of R 6 2 R over R 2 R (the non-sethood of R notwithstanding). But as we have seen, Kreisel's original incompleteness result concerns not R, but rather an arithmetized analog of the collection R 0 consisting of those numbers which are not members of the classes which they name. We have seen that no predicative definition of the collection R 0 is possible. But if we additionally attempt to probe our "naive" intuitions about the nameability relation, it would seem that there is no abiding reason to think that the number which names R 0 (were one to exist) either should or should not be a member of R 0 . And as I will now discuss, this appears to conform with what Kreisel himself thought about the status of the undecidable sentence k 2 K obtained in Proposition 4.3. Kreisel (1950, p. 267) originally formulated a version of Proposition 4.3 in the course of attempting to confirm a conjecture of Bernays (Hilbert & Bernays, 1939, p. 191/199 ) -i.e. that the predicate calculus is not complete with respect to models in which all predicates are computable [berechenbare], or as we would now say, 0 1 -definable. This informed his discussion of the distinction between the Gödel sentence Z for an arithmetical theory Z such as PA and the undecidable Kreisel sentence k 2 K obtained in Proposition 4.3 over a system similar to S. We would now 53 On the other hand, the current setting highlights the additional complications required to formalize the reasoning of antinomies such as the paradoxes of reciprocated or grounded classes which are themselves simplifications of the Burali-Forti and Mirimano↵ paradoxes. Pace Priest (1994) , this suggests that the classification of these antinomies as paradoxes of self-reference is in need of further refinement. 54 Wang (1963, p. 386) would later liken his "second approach" to the paradoxes to the proposal of Fitch (1952) of blocking the reasoning of Russell's paradox by denying that the law of the excluded middle holds for the statement R 2 R (see §18). Fitch's proposal is based on his claim that both R 2 R and the Liar express "indefinite propositions" which lack truth values. But his account of why this is so (1952, §1.4) amounts to little more than the observation that were these statements to possess a definite truth value then a contradiction would be derivable in the calculus he describes. While this approach is also reminiscent of that adopted by certain axiomatic theories of truth (see §5.5), Fitch's proposal can also be contrasted with the one proposed here in virtue of failing to provide an independent explanation of the relevant failure of excluded middle.
Absolute undecidability?
express his point by saying that while Z is a ⇧ 0 1 -sentence, k 2 K can be taken to have the form of either a ⌃ 0 2 or a ⇧ 0 2 -sentence. This follows immediately from the biconditional (4.6) together with the fact that Theorem 3.2 yields a 0 2 definition of 2 ⇤ . But whichever form we take k 2 K to have, it cannot be equivalent to a 0 1 -formula as all such statements are decidable in Z.
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On the other hand, recall that Z is provably equivalent over Z to 8x¬Proof Z (x, p Z q) which is a ⇧ 0 1 statement. Gödel's proof of the first incompleteness theorem shows that if Z is !-consistent then Z 6 ¬ Z . But as Kreisel (1950, p. 278) observed, Z must then be true in the standard model N .
56 However Kreisel also observed that there is no evident way to extend this familiar observation beyond the class of ⇧ 0 1 -statements to argue from the undecidability of a ⇧ 0 2 -or ⌃ 0 2 -sentence like k 2 K to its truth or falsity. On this basis he suggested that predicates defining classes such as K should be understood as "not [making] a division of integers into two classes T, F but rather three T, F, U" (1950, p. 283). Kreisel echoed more explicitly the view that class (as opposed to set) membership need not be understood as bivalent in (1967, p. 143) in the context of formulating a theory of sets and what he refers to as definable properties which is otherwise similar to S (pp. 162-165). And he later went so far as to remark that "nobody has any idea whether [k 2 K] is true or false" (Kreisel, 1969, p. 112) .
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In order to understand what might be at stake with such pronouncements, it is useful to recall that Kreisel (1967, pp. 151-152) himself proposed a three-way classification of formally undecidable statements. The first class contains metamathematical ⇧ 0 1 -statements like Z whose undecidability entails their truth via the sort of argument just rehearsed. The second class contains the Continuum Hypothesis which Kreisel (1967, p. 150) famously argued is such that either it or its negation is a second-order logical truth. And the third contains examples like the Parallel Postulate which he observed are such that their truth values are not fixed by adopting a second-order formulation of the geometric axioms.
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To take seriously Kreisel's apparent proposal about the non-bivalence of class membership or Wang's related suggestion that the paradoxes can be avoided by "admitting paradoxical classes" but "treating as undecided" questions about membership within them, more still needs to be said about the formal properties of the undecidable sentences constructed in §4. As I will suggest below, such statements do not fit comfortably into any of Kreisel's categories. In order to see why this is so it will be useful to first highlight several respects in which they are similar to prototypical members of the first class. But I will then suggest that they also have an important a nity with both the second and third. Feferman (1960) originally classified Gödel's first incompleteness theorem for PA as an extensional result in the sense that the undecidability of its Gödel 55 Kreisel (1950, p. 275) claimed on this basis that Proposition 4.3 is already su cient to provide an answer to Hilbert & Bernays's question. But as Wang (1953) later observed, the fact that the specific predicate 2 ⇤ constructed in this proof yields an undecidable statement is not on its own su cient to show that there does not exist an arithmetical model of S in which the interpretation of 2 is recursive. The non-existence of such an interpretation was later shown by Rabin (1958) using an argument involving recursively inseparable sets similar to the one which is now typically employed in the proof of Tennenbaum's Theorem (e.g. Kaye, 1991, §11) . 56 For if it were false, then N |= Proof Z (n, p Z q) for some n 2 N. But since Z is su ciently strong to prove all true 0 0 -statements, then Z`Proof Z (n, p Z q) and thus Z`¬ Z . 57 See, (Manevitz & Stavi, 1980, p. 146) and (Isaacson, 2011, p. 54) for similar assessments which anticipate the argument of §5.4. 58 I.e. when the Continuity Axioms -V in (Hilbert, 1899) -are formalized as secondorder statements rather than first-order schemes.
Intensionality
sentence PA only depends on the fact that the arithmetical formula employed to formalize provability weakly represents derivability from its axioms. But he also famously illustrated a sense in which Gödel's second theorem is intensional by showing that in addition to the "canonical" consistency statement Con(PA) -for which PA 6 Con(PA) as long as is PA consistent -it is also possible to construct a formula Con 0 (PA) expressing consistency relative to a di↵erent binumeration of the axioms of PA such that PA`Con 0 (PA). Other parameters which have the potential for introducing similar sensitivities into the formulation of undecidability results include the following: i) the arithmetical encoding which is chosen to Gödel number terms and formulas; ii) the chosen form of the Diagonal Lemma which is employed to generate "selfreferential" statements; iii) the definitions of proof and provability on which the definition of formulas such as Con(T) are based.
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It is thus also natural to ask how the intensional aspects of arithmetization bear on the results of §4. For concreteness, let T be a recursively axiomatizable L Z -theory extending I⌃2. The simplest example of an undecidable statement we have considered is the Liar-like sentence constructed in Lemma 4.1 by diagonalizing directly on the formula (x) which defines a Henkin-completion of T. By examining the details of this construction, it is easy to see that parameters i) -iii) all contribute to the identity of and thus also to that of the other undecidable statements constructed in §4. But this is also true of a number of parameters specific to the formalization of the Henkin construction on which the definition of (x) is based. A non-exhaustive list of these is as follows: iv) the extension of the Gödel numbering p·q to the Henkin language L In order to gauge the extent to which these parameters bear on the results of §4, consider an L T -formula ⇢(x) satisfying the following derivability-like conditions:
By mimicking the reasoning of Lemma 4.1 we obtain Proposition 5.1 Suppose that ⇢(x) satisfies (5.6a,b) and that is such that T` $ ¬⇢(p q). If T + Con(T) is consistent, then is undecidable in T.
It is not hard to see that if (x) is defined as in §3.3 it will satisfy (5.6a,b) as long as the formulas Prov T (x) and Con(T) are defined canonically -in fact these properties are consequences of (3.7a,e). And from this it follows that the undecidability of the formula obtained in Corollary 4.2 will not depend on any of the parameters i)-ii) and iv)-x).
60 In virtue of (4.1c), this observation extends to sentences such as k 2 K, Tr ⇤ , or Het ⇤ (h ⇤ ) which are provably equivalent to their negations under the interpretation (·) ⇤ . Thus although the method by which these statements are shown to be undecidable di↵ers from that by which Gödel originally showed the undecidability of Z , the results of §4 are also reasonably invariant with respect to the intensional parameters enumerated above.
On the other hand, it is also easy to see that statements like do not resemble Gödel sentences in other respects. For suppose that T, Prov T (x), and Con(T) are defined canonically. Another familiar observation is that if ' is a fixed point of the formula ¬Prov T (x) -i.e. T`' $ ¬Prov T (p'q) -then T`' $ Con(T). Thus all Gödel sentences for T are provably equivalent to the canonical consistency statement for T and hence to one another.
But now consider the predicate ¬ (x). As we have seen, the Diagonal Lemma yields the existence of a sentence ¬ such that T` ¬ $ ¬ (p ¬ q). While both (x) and Prov T (x) satisfy (5.6a), only (x) satisfies (5.6b). But in virtue of this we have T¬ (p ¬ q) $ (p¬ ¬ q) and thus also T`¬ ¬ $ ¬ (p¬ ¬ q). It hence follows that ¬ ¬ is another provable fixed point of ¬ (x) which is not provably equivalent to ¬ (unless T is inconsistent).
These considerations suggest that the undecidable statements constructed in §4 di↵er from traditional Gödel sentences in that they lack what can reasonably be described as a Suppose that we have fixed choices for parameters i) and iv) so that we have a Gödel numbering of L H T and that the enumeration in question is also given by some fixed recursive function j (x) such that j (0) = p 0q, j (1) = p 1q, . . . Additionally suppose that we have fixed parameter vii) in accordance with (3.6) such that a formula i is added to the set Henkin, 1949) . Now suppose that ' is undecidable in T and that ' is also the first sentence in the enumeration -i.e. ' = 0. Since in this case T 6 ¬', we will thus have that ' 2 1 T and thus also ' 2 T . If (x) formalizes the definition of T based on these choices, then we will also have N |= (p'q) -i.e. when our formalization of the Henkin construction is carried out relative to the standard model, ' will be included in the maximally consistent set of sentences defined by (x). By parallel reasoning, if it turned out that ¬' = 0, then we would have that N |= (p¬'q) and thus also N |= ¬ (p'q).
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60 This is in conformity with Feferman's (1960, p. 39) original characterization of Theorem 3.2 as a result of "mixed extensional and intensional type". For as he observes, while the proof does depend on the fact that Con(T) is defined canonically, it does not depend on the formula we have chosen to binumerate the axioms of T in defining the predicate Prov T (x). Note, however, that this is a parameter which we do not otherwise need to be concerned with in the case where T is a finitely axiomatizable theory such as GB or ACA0. 61 Manevitz & Stavi (1980) similarly observed that by defining Con 1 (T) = Con(T) and Con n+1 (T) = Con(T + Con n (T)) and defining an enumeration which begins with Con 1 (T), Con 2 (T), Con n 1 (T), ¬Con n (T) we are able to control the number of times which certain definitions of (x) may be iterated before the set defined by the iterates 0 (x) = (x), i+1 (x) = i (p (ẋ)q) becomes inconsistent. On the other hand, they also showed (1980, §3) that there exist other definitions of (x) (which can even be 0 2 ) whose iterates define consistent sets for all i 2 N. As Kreisel's "model theoretic" proof of the second incompleteness theorem (as presented by Smorynski, 1977, §6) depends Next let f0(x, y) and f1(x, y) be recursive functions such that if j (x) determines an enumeration of sentences as above, then f 0 (j,k) (x) determines the enumeration which lists k first and then continues as j (x) but omitting k -i.e. k , 0, 1, . . . , k 1 , k+1 , . . . (presuming k > 0) -and f 1 (j,k) (x) determines the enumeration which lists ¬ k first and then continues as j (x) -i.e. ¬ k , 0, 1, . . . , k 1 , k+1 , . . . In cases where the undecidability of a given sentence ' does not depend on the choice of an enumeration of L H T itself (e.g. Gödel sentences), these definitions allow us to uniformly define Henkincompletions of T in which (p'q) is either true or false in N simply by fixing the stage at which ' is enumerated.
On the other hand, the construction of clearly does depend on the definition of (x) and hence on the chosen enumeration. Nonetheless, we can obtain the following:
Proposition 5.2 Let T be as above. Then there exist L T -formulas 0(x) and 1(x) defining Henkin-complete extensions of T such that the statements 0 and 1 respectively obtained by applying the Diagonal Lemma to ¬ 0(x) and ¬ 1(x) have the following properties: i) if T + Con(T) is consistent, then 0 and 1 are both undecidable in T; ii) 0 is false in N ; iii) 1 is true in N . Proof. We have just seen that it is possible to parameterize the definition of the formula i(x) defining a Henkin-complete extension of T based on the extension condition (3.6) in the index i of a given enumeration -say
Since a standard formalization of the Diagonal Lemma allows us to e↵ectively construct a fixedpoint formula for i(x), there is also a recursive function g(i) such that T` g(i) $ ¬ i(p g(i) q). We may hence consider the enumerations f 0 (i,g(i)) (x) and f 1 (i,g(i)) (x) whose first elements are respectively g(i) and ¬ g (i) . By the Recursion Theorem (e.g. Rogers, 1987, §11. 2) there exist n0, n1 2 N such that f 0 (n 0 ,g(n 0 )) (x) = n 0 (x) and
n 0 (x) and n 1 (x) hence respectively define enumerations beginning with g(n 0 ) and ¬ g(n 1 ) and which are also such that
Since n 0 (x) and n 1 (x) satisfy (5.6a,b), 0 = df g(n 0 ) and 1 = df g(n 1 ) will both be undecidable in T provided that T + Con(T) is consistent. Since 0 and ¬ 1 occur first in the enumerations respectively defined by n 0 (x) and n 1 (x), we will hence have that N |= n 0 (p 0q) and N |= n 1 (p¬ 1q) and thus also N |= ¬ n 1 (p 1q). But now by (5.7a,b), we also have N |= ¬ 0 and N |= 1.
⇤ Proposition 5.2 shows that the truth value of is indeed not fixed independently of the definition of the Henkin-completion (x) relative to which it is defined. But one might still attempt to fix the truth value of such a statement by restricting attention to definitions of (x) satisfying conditions which might be argued to characterize "canonical" formalizations of the Henkin procedure. In fact Kreisel (1965, §3.222 ) provided a precedent for this approach by proposing that we should regard an arithmetical formula Prov T as "canonically representing" provability in a theory T if its structure reflects that of the inductive definition of the derivability relation T`'.
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Pace Kreisel, Halbach & Visser (2014a) provide a number of examples which illustrate that such judgements of "resemblance" between metatheoretic and object language definitions are di cult to make precise, even in the case of provability. As we have seen, a on the fact that i (x) defines an inconsistent set for some i, this illustrates a sense in which this result is also intensional in Feferman's sense. 62 Such a definition must evidently be ⌃ 0 1 . Kreisel's criterion is thus su cient to exclude from consideration the provability predicate involved in Feferman's (1960) formalization of the Henkin procedure must build on such a definition while also contending with parameters iv) -viii). Several related considerations would seem to diminish even further the prospects of defining a notion of canonicity for arithmetical definitions of completions of T in a manner which would allow us to non-stipulatively determine the truth values of sentences like : 1) Let = {' | N |= (p'q)} be the set of sentences defined by (x) relative to the standard model. By definition, ◆ T and is consistent (as long as T is). But since (x) is an arithmetical sentence, we cannot have = T A (i.e. True Arithmetic) in light of Tarski's Theorem. Hence any candidate for (x) must incorrectly decides some arithmetical sentence.
2) The sequence of definitions given in §3.3 gives rise to a definition of (x) which is 0 2 . But in fact this establishes neither an upper nor a lower bound on the complexity of formulas which can define Henkin-complete extensions of T. For on the one hand, Putnam (1965) showed that it is possible to find such a definition in the class ⌃ 63 And on the other, as long as T is a sound theory it is also possible to increase the complexity of (x) by modifying parameter vii) (i.e. the extension condition) so that all sentences which are added to fall under the partial truth predicate Tr⌃ k+1 (x) (which provably cannot be defined by a ⇧ 0 k -formula).
3) The property Hcm T (x) which holds of the code of a formula just in case it defines a Henkin-complete extension of T is itself arithmetically definable. But it is easy to see that even if we restrict attention to is not only independent of T but such that T + and T + ¬ are both interpretable in Ti.e. so that is an Orey sentence for T.
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These observations would appear to rule out a number of otherwise plausible means of imposing conditions on a "canonical" definition of (x) so as to determine the truth value of . 66 This in turn suggests that sentences like do not fall naturally into any of Kreisel's three categories of undecidable statements. For in regard to the first, note that sentences like are clearly metamathematical in character -e.g. in virtue of their explicit reliance on an arithmetization of syntax. But such sentences are neither ⇧ 0 1 nor are they defined such that the metatheoretic property which they express is clearly true or false on the intended interpretation of either T or its metatheory.
63 Putnam (1957) had previously shown that this cannot be improved to ⌃ On the other, it is easy to see that there is a reduction from the canonical ⇧ 0 2 -complete set TOT of indices of total recursive functions to Hcm(x) . 65 This fact is mentioned in passing and without proof by Visser (1998, p. 323) . One way in which it can be shown is by modifying parameter iii) -i.e. the formalization of provability -in the style of Feferman (1960) and then invoking the Orey-GauspariLindström Theorem (see Lindström, 1997, p. 81) .The relevant techniques and several generalizations will be developed in a sequel to this paper. 66 For instance in light of 1) and 2), there appears to be no principled means of restricting attention to a particular formula class in attempting to define a completion which better approximates T A. And in light of 3), we cannot even uniformly decide which arithmetical formulas we should consider for performing this task.
In regard to Kreisel's second category, note that however (x) is defined, will be provably equivalent to a first-order arithmetical statement. It is thus unlike the Continuum Hypothesis in not admitting a higher-order formulation whose truth value can be a↵ected by the external interpretation of the second-order quantifiers. But at the same time, there are also choices of (x) for which will share an important a nity with CH which, it will be recalled, is an Orey sentence for ZFC. And thus if (x) is chosen per 4) so that is also an Orey sentence for T, then it will be like CH in the sense that the adjunction of either it or its negation to T yields an extension which does not increase consistency strength.
In regard to Kreisel's third category, the received view to which he appears to be reacting in (1967) holds that the choice between Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries -and thus the truth or falsity of the Parallel Postulate -is conventional. On the other hand, is an arithmetical formula and the received view here holds that arithmetic is unlike geometry in having a determinant subject matter. Proponents of this position will thus hold that once (x) is fixed, will have a determinate truth value in N . On this basis it might initially seem far fetched to think that the choice between and ¬ could in any sense be conventional.
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But to reach such a conclusion summarily would be to overlook the origin of and the other undecidable statements which we have been considering. For since (x) defines a Henkin-complete extension of T, we have seen that it may be understood semantically as defining a model M |= T from the standpoint of the standard model N |= T + Con(T) which, on the received view, is the intended interpretation of T. Since is derived by diagonalizing (x), it also seems reasonable to maintain that the description of such a model contributes to its meaning. But as we have seen, not only must any model defined in this way be nonstandard, Proposition 5.2 also demonstrates that we have considerable flexibility in constructing M -inclusive of controlling whether it satisfies itself. Thus absent principled criteria by which we may rule out various candidate definitions of (x), it would seem that the truth value of the corresponding sentences is indeed conventional to at least the extent that the choice between di↵erent arithmetically definable nonstandard models of T is. 68 5.5. Comparison with axiomatic theories of truth A satisfactory assessment of Kreisel and Wang's approach described at the beginning of this section would also need to further integrate the foregoing observations about undecidable statements obtained in §4 with an account of the relationship which they bear to the paradoxes which 67 For instance Koellner (2009) appears to suggest that being an Orey sentence for ZFC is a necessary but not su cient condition for regarding the truth value of a set theoretical statement as one of "mere expedience". On the other hand, he rules out the possibility that arithmetical Orey sentences have this status by fiat. 68 An analogous sequence of observations will be true for the other undecidable statements constructed in §4. For note that the only features of the sentence on which Proposition 5.2 depends are that it is undecidable in T and that it may be constructed e↵ectively from the definition of (x). A version of this result will thus be true, e.g., for the Kreisel sentence k 2 K constructed in the proof of Proposition 4.3. But now suppose that we take M |= S + Con(S) to be the intended model of S. Then it will be possible to define predicates 0(x) and 1(x) defining Henkin-complete extensions of S such that the sentences k0 2 K0 and k1 2 K1 obtained from the corresponding interpretations (·) 0 and (·) 1 in the manner of Proposition 4.3 are respectively false and true in M. But via a series of observations analogous to those recorded in §3.3, it is easy to see that 0(x) and 1(x) will both define !-nonstandard extensions of M. It would thus again appear that we are free to choose between them -and also the truth value of the relevant instantiation of the Kreisel sentence -without contravening our conviction that M is the intended model of S. are used to generate them. We have already seen in §5.1 that one potential view is that these statements should be regarded as the images of the paradoxical ones under Hilbert & Bernays's method of arithmetization. And thus at least from the perspective of their finiten Standpunkt, it is not unreasonable to think that the paradoxes are indeed dissolved in virtue of the relevant undecidability results.
A further comparison can also be framed between Hilbert & Bernays's approach to the semantic paradoxes and that provided by contemporary axiomatic theories of truth. Theories of this sort are typically put forth in an attempt to formalize portions of our reasoning about the "everyday" notion of truth or truth simpliciter as it is sometimes called -i.e. truth in some fixed intended interpretation rather than in an arbitrary model.
69 As such, an axiomatic theory of truth is typically formed by adjoining to PA axioms or rules involving a primitive predicate T(x) intended to express this notion. Examples of such LT = L Z [ {T(x)} theories include PAT, CT, FS, and KF, familiarity with which will be assumed in the sequel.
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The properties of T(x) which are axiomatized by these theories may be contrasted with those which hold for the various defined notions of truth we have been considering. Of these, it seems reasonable to take as basic the L 2 Z truth definition Tr(x) introduced in §4.3.1. As we have seen, this definition essentially involves impredicative second-order quantification. Hilbert & Bernays thus possessed a natural motivation to interpret Tr(x) via the method of arithmetization. This may in turn may be achieved by applying the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem to obtain a mapping (·)
which is an interpretation of a theory such as ACA0 in which it is possible to develop the properties of Tr(x) relative to a first-order theory such as PA + Con(ACA0).
One axis along which it is possible to compare the properties of these formulas with those of a primitive truth predicate T(x) is with respect to the status of the resulting Liar-like sentences. Recall that the sentences Tr and Tr ⇤ are respectively provable and undecidable over ACA0. To assess the status of the analogous sentence for T(x) let T be T = df ¬T(subst(l, l)) where l = pT(subst(x, x))q. This will be a 0 0 -formula of LT if we assume that the substitution function is in the language. But although in this case we have PAT` T $ ¬T(p Tq), it is a consequence of well-known results that the status of T depends on the truth-theoretic axioms which are adopted.
Proposition 5.3 i) T is derivable in any theory extending PAT which includes the axiom 8x(T(x) ! SentL Z (x)) asserting that only arithmetical sentences fall under T(x) ; ii) T is also derivable in KF presuming that this theory is understood to include the consistency axiom Cons (i.e. 8x(SentL T (x) ! ¬(T(x)^T(¬x)))) ; iii) T is undecidable in FS presuming that FS is consistent.
Although the axiom 8x(T(x) ! SentL Z (x)) is not typically included in any of the theories mentioned above, it may be naturally adjoined to theories such as CT which are intended to axiomatize a typed notion of truth in the sense that their axioms do not imply that T(x) holds of any statements which contain this predicate itself. As such, part i) of Proposition 5.3 reflects that if we took the additional step of asserting that T(x) cannot hold of such statements, then we would be able to prove ¬Tr(p Tq) -and hence also T -in virtue of the fact that T is an LT-sentence which is not an L Z -sentence. This can be compared to the fact that Tr is provable in ACA0 in virtue of the fact that it is an L 2 Z -sentence which is also not an L Z -sentence. On the other hand, no such restriction is imposed by the untyped theories FS and KF, both of which contain principles which imply that T(x) holds of sentences containing this predicate. In this setting the undecidability of T is sometimes presented as a positive 69 See, e.g., (Dummett, 1978, p. 123) , (Field, 2008, §1) , and (Cieśliński, 2018, §2) . 70 For axiomatizations and accounts of the results assumed below see (Halbach, 2011) . feature of FS as it is taken to accord with the intuition that the Liar sentence obtained from a predicate formalizing the "everyday" notion of truth does not have a determinate truth value.
71 On the other hand, the derivability of Tr -and thus also ¬T(p Trq) -has been presented as evidence that KF is not a "natural" or "intuitively plausible" theory of truth.
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We have seen that an interpretation (·) ⇤ : L 2 Z ! L Z may be understood as a typelowering operator in the sense that the image of an L 2 Z -sentence under (·) ⇤ is an L Zsentence. From this it follows that Tr ⇤ (p'q) will not always be refutable in ACA0 in instances in which ' contains the formula Tr ⇤ (x) itself. For instance, we have seen that if PA`', then PA`Tr ⇤ (pTr ⇤ (p'q)q) and we have also seen that Tr ⇤ is undecidable even in ACA0 (presuming that ACA0 + Con(ACA0) is consistent).
The latter result is analogous to the undecidability of T in FS in that both results can be obtained by noting that Tr ⇤ (x) and T(x) both satisfy necessitation and consistencycum-completeness conditions similar to (5.6a,b). But since T(x) is a primitive predicate, it seems that Proposition 5.3iii) does little more than rea rm a brute intuition about the status of the Liar.
73 On the other hand, the considerations adduced in §5.4 suggest an explanation of why it is reasonable to regard Tr ⇤ as indeterminate in truth value in virtue of the intensional exigencies which must be confronted to define a predicate which provably satisfies these properties.
These considerations suggest that it may be of independent interest to explore the use of arithmetically definable predicates such as Tr ⇤ (x) to obtain models of various axiomatic theories of truth. If we take to heart Hilbert & Bernays's admonishments about the foundational significance of the truth predicate (1939, pp. 338-339/351-353) , we should presumably view truth-theoretic reasoning as subsumed by a portion of mathematics whose consistency must be accounted for by other means. 74 The natural targets in this regard thus become theories such as CT and FS -i.e. the typed compositional and Friedman-Sheard theories with induction restricted to L Z -which are conservative over PA.
One feature which is often cited in favor of these systems is that they validate a disquotational characterization of truth in that they prove the T-biconditionals for all L Zsentences. On the other hand, since PA + Con(ACA0)`' ⇤ $ (p'q) for all L 2 Z -sentences, it additionally follows from the provability of the T-biconditionals (4.16) in ACA0 that 71 On this point see (Kripke, 1975, p. 707, pp. 714-715) , (Reinhardt, 1986, p. 238) , (McGee, 1990, p. 14) , (Feferman, 1991, p. 41) . 72 See, e.g., (Halbach & Horsten, 2006, p. 682) . This paper also presents a "partial" version of KF without Cons in which the undecidability of T is restored. 73 See, e.g., (Horsten, 2011, p. 112) . 74 It would be anachronistic to try to locate the views of either Hilbert or Bernays with respect to the latter day debate about deflationism. But it may still be noted that in (1939, §5.2e) they appear to disavow the instrumental use of truth-theoretic reasoning in consistency proofs of the sort considered by Reinhardt (1986 ) or Feferman (1991 .
yielding a model M3 |= PA which must be recursively saturated by Proposition 5.4. But now note that the iterated procedure is already describable from the perspective of M1 by considering the formula 2 (x) = (p (ẋ))q).
It is a consequence of another well-known theorem of Kotlarski, Krajewski, & Lachlan (1981) that any countable recursively saturated model M |= PA admits a satisfaction class S ✓ |M|. From this it follows that hM, Si will be a model of CT . Three questions which arise naturally at this stage but which will have to await other occasions are as follows: 1) Can the definition of such a satisfaction class be formalized in PA (or a weaker theory) by generalizing the techniques of §3.3? 2) If so, can the iteration of this method be formalized to obtain a definition of a type-free satisfaction class 77 which would provide an interpretation of FS in PA? 3) How would such constructions interact with the other intensional parameters which have been suggested in §5.4 to be intrinsic to the arithmetization of the completeness theorem?
78 §6. Conclusion The goal of this paper has been to o↵er a systematic reconstruction and generalization of a method for transforming paradoxes into formal incompleteness results originally due to Kreisel and Wang, building on work of Hilbert and Bernays. The following is a summary of the historical points which I have sought to highlight and synthesize: 1) Hilbert & Bernays's presentation of Gödel's incompleteness theorems in the second volume of the Grundlagen der Mathematik (1939) was not isolated from the other aspects of their development of the finitary standpoint. Rather they refine and elaborate on prior discussions of the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes, their development of second-order logic, and their appreciation of the diagonal method -e.g. in (Hilbert, 1917) , (Hilbert & Ackermann, 1928) , and (Hilbert & Bernays, 1934, §7) . On this basis, they also made substantial advances to the formalization of semantic concepts leading to their formal truth definition for first-order arithmetic presented in (1939, §5.2e). 2) Bernays appreciated the relationship between these developments and Gödel's (1930) proof of the completeness theorem for first-order logic, which itself was grounded in concepts and methods presented in these prior sources. In particular, he realized Gödel's proof could be formalized in an arithmetical language, which in turn led to his formulation of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem in (1939, §4.2). 3) This result can also be understood as a mathematical embodiment of what Hilbert & Bernays refer to as the method of arithmetization (1934, pp. 1-3, 18-19) which they (and others in the Göttingen school) had sought to employ in consistency proofs for 77 See (Halbach, 2011, §14.1) . 78 A positive answer to question 1) is stated by Enayat & Visser (2015, §16.5 ) on the basis of their method for constructing full satisfaction classes which avoids the techniques of M -logic originally employed by Kotlarski, Krajewski, & Lachlan (1981) . In fact by using either a formalized version of this construction or the arithmetization of the conservativity proof for CT via the corrected cut elimination argument of Leigh (2015) , it is in principle possible to obtain an interpretation of CT in PA (as was originally observed by Fischer, 2009 ). The full details of the relevant techniques have not yet been published. But it may still be noted in regard to question 3) that they all rely on variants of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem -e.g. in order to formalize the compactness and elementary chain arguments of (Enayat & Visser, 2015) or to obtain an interpretation on the basis of the conservativity of CT via the Orey Compactness Theorem (see, e.g., Lindström, 1997, p. 80) .
instances of "formal axiomatics" since the 1890s. This included axiomatizations not only of Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries, but also of mathematical physics, analysis, and set theory which Hilbert & Bernays speak of as "transcend[ing] the realm of experience and intuitive self-evidence" (1934, p. 3/3). 4) Kreisel (1950 Kreisel ( , 1953 ) described a means of combining Bernays's formalization of Gödel's completeness theorem and his incompleteness theorems by applying the former to an axiomatic system S of sets and classes similar to Gödel-Bernays set theory. In this way he showed that it is possible to formulate a sentence  akin to the statement that the Russell class is not a member of itself. Although  is refutable in S, Kreisel showed that its image  ⇤ under an interpretation derived from the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem is formally undecidable in S (provided that S + Con(S) is consistent). Kreisel's method was later presented in a more accessible form by Wang (1955 Wang's result is in turn similar to Bernays's original explanation of how arithmetical formalization transforms the Liar paradox into a non-derivability result (1939, §5.2c). As Bernays notes, this renders the system F in which Hilbert & Bernays carried out their formalization incomplete rather than inconsistent. The incompleteness theorems have, of course, persistently been regarded as undermining the goal of the Hilbert program understood as that of o↵ering a finitary consistency proof for infinitary mathematics in which Hilbert and his collaborators had hoped to formalize analysis (and of which systems like GB and ACA0 are natural exemplars). But it is also notable that Bernays appears to have come to view the results in question as playing a salutary role in his mature understanding of the program. For not only did he suggest that the reception of the incompleteness theorems within proof theory has led to other "constructive" techniques for proving consistency (e.g. Bernays, 1954b, pp. 10-11) , he went to considerable lengths to illustrate how the method of arithmetization itself leads to such a proof for a fragment of his own axiomatization of set theory (Bernays, 1954a, §19) . For as we have seen, such a construction can be understood as showing that even if we work over a language which is su ciently expressive to formulate the relevant "paradoxical notions", the corresponding "paradoxical statements" do not give rise to contradictions but are rather transformed into undecidable ones.
The events just summarized have their origins within the foundational developments of the 1900s-1930s which have been widely scrutinized by philosophers of mathematics. Nonetheless, the methods and results just described have received little notice outside the developments within mathematical logic to which they directly contributed (on which see Dean, 2017 and Dean & Walsh, 2017) . Two apparent reasons for this are as follows. First, despite its classical origins, the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem remains largely unknown to philosophers. Second, Kreisel and Wang's methodological reflections notwithstanding, the possibility that formal incompleteness might contribute to a uniform resolution to the paradoxes (rather than merely being a byproduct of them) has been largely overlooked within latter day work in philosophical logic. I will conclude by o↵ering a brief comment on the prospects for further developments in each of these regards.
As I have attempted to illustrate in §3 and §4, the methods employed in the proof of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem are both general in scope and flexible with respect to the sorts of interpretations they can be used to construct. In particular, while Theorems 3.2 and 3.4 are traditionally presented as applying to first-order theories, it is striking that Kreisel and Wang's original application of these results was to a theory similar to one which is now often described as second-order -i.e. Gödel-Bernays set theory. As we have seen, there is no tension here because it is possible to regard both Z -theories such as ACA0 as two-sorted first-order systems. But as we are now in a better position to appreciate, when we apply Theorem 3.2 to such a theory to yield an interpretation 2 ⇤ of the symbol 2 in the language of first-order arithmetic, we are explicitly treating membership as a non-logical relation whose extension we can control in the manner illustrated by results like Proposition 5.2. This in turn highlights in vivid terms what is at issue in applying the method of arithmetization to theories su cient for the development of analysis or set theory.
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In §5 I have attempted to lay out some of the philosophical exigencies which Wang's second alternative -i.e. that of "admitting paradoxical classes" but "treating as undecided" questions about membership in them -would presumably have to face were it to be developed systematically. And although I have not articulated an explicit thesis about the resolution of the paradoxes here, we are now also in an improved position to appreciate two potentially attractive features of such an approach. First, we have seen how Wang's proposal grows naturally out of considerations which have their origin in Hilbert & Bernays's finitary standpoint. This in turn suggests that it may be useful to adopt such a perspective in our approach to the paradoxes -e.g. to provide a set of foundational and methodological desiderata against which to compare proposals of the sort which is often lacking in contemporary philosophical theorizing. Second, I have suggested in §5 that the resulting developments can be understood as providing at least a technical explanation of why the resulting formalized versions of paradoxical statements are formally undecidable -a feature which has been repeatedly advertised as a virtue of various axiomatic approaches to the semantic paradoxes.
80 As I have suggested, however, the ultimate evaluation of Wang's proposal must await a more thorough account of the sort of incompleteness which is at issue -e.g. Is the basis for the undecidability of the statements constructed in §4 best understood in semantic, epistemic, or conventional terms? How do the various dimensions of intensionality discussed in §5 bear on this?
